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The purposes for this research have included:
1. To evaluate studies that have attempted to make a
cost analysis of either Regular Navy or Naval Reserve
Force ships.
2. To collect and analyze data related to the costs of
operating selected Regular Navy and NRF ships during
Fiscal Year 1986.
The focus of this work were the costs observed by eight
selected Pacific Fleet frigates. Of the eight, four each
belonged to the Regular Navy and the NRF. Of these, two
ships were of the FF-1052 ( Knox ) class, while the other two
belonged to the FFG-7 ( Perrv ) class.
Operating costs were divided into three families: man-
power, equipment and supplies, and variable costs of
operation. Data was obtained in most cases from original
documents and ship's manning records.
The thesis observed that the actual costs of operating
an FF-1052 class in the NRF was higher than to do so in the
Regular Navy. By contrast, FFG-7s proved to be more economi-
cal when associated with the Naval Reserve Force.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. THESIS OVERVIEW
An ongoing debate centers around the issues of cost and
readiness in the military. The United States has tradi-
tionally been a nation that has favored mobilization of the
citizen-soldier over maintaining a large standing armed
service. The position of the nation today, as the bedrock of
the Western alliance, has appeared to demand a substantial
force of active duty soldiers and sailors. These personnel
are deployed overseas or are ready for immediate employment
at no small expense to the American taxpayer. The alterna-
tive, to train and equip civilians temporarily for military
service when emergencies arise, has its own price in
training and readiness that must be considered.
The fundamental question then, is whether the United
States need expend limited resources in maintaining its
armed forces in their present state and if not, then
identify the structure of the optimal force.
This thesis takes the larger question of total military
resources and focuses the subject to within the boundaries
of naval surface combatant manning. Need we have a standing
naval force manned exclusively by active duty (AD) person-
nel? Is a force structure that emphasizes the resources of
our citizen sailors more affordable?' What are the opposing
costs and resulting impact of each upon our national defense
goals?
To provide further insights into this issue, this thesis
will:
1. Introduce and evaluate the costing models developed
by previous studies.
2. Isolate reliable data sources or effective costing
equations.
3. Evaluate actual costs observed in operating
comparable Reserve and active duty frigates of the
FF-1052 (Knox) and FFG-7 (Oliver Hazard Perry)
classes. (What are the everyday costs of fuel,
supplies, and replacement spares that the ship needs
to operate?)
4. Evaluate the indirect cost effects of the transfer of
these ships from the active duty force to the Naval
Reserve Force (NRF). (In a world of constrained
assets, do active duty frigates spend more time at
sea, as more of their sister-ships leave active
service to join the NRF?)
5. Formulate an improved costing system that integrates
the experience of past researchers.
One of the premiere benefits that this study enjoys is
The organization of the Naval Reserve and its applica-
tion to this thesis is described in greater detail in
Appendix A.
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that these ships, which have been the topic of recent
research efforts, have now been in both active duty and
reserve service long enough to approach the steady-state
condition for manpower and operational costing. While lead
ships of both classes entered active service in the 1970's,
it was only in Fiscal Year (FY) 1982 that the Navy trans-
ferred the first four ships of the FF-1052 class to the NRF.
Studies conducted previously have targetted the problem in
theory or, in those cases where observations were recorded,
in conditions that may have been unstable.
What this study will endeavor to do then, is to document
the costs of these ships as they now operate. The methodolo-
gy that this employs is to evaluate the existing secondary
references and data sources (many of which were the subjects
of previous studies) and to focus the costing problem on
individual ships and associated supporting shore commands. A
sample of both active duty and reserve frigates will be
considered in this manner. Primary sources and data will be
developed from interviews conducted with the current
principle operators, planners, and theorists in the NRF
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Frigate Implementation Program.
The nature of the data will be examined in much greater
detail as the thesis discusses each costing sub-category.
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
This thesis consists of an abstract, six chapters, and
two appendices.
1 . Abstract
A brief executive summary, highlighting the
methodology of the thesis, the nature and success of
data collection efforts, noteworthy exceptions in
costing philosophy, an analysis of the data, and
abbreviated conclusions.
2. Chapter I - Introduction
Introauces the purposes and scope of the thesis.
3. Chapter II - Unit Manpower Costs
This chapter deals with the issues associated with
manpower assignments to active duty and Naval Reserve
Force frigates. It summarizes the nature of the costs
found in each of the sub-categories that comprise the
total manpower equation, and isolates the techniques
(and relative merit) of other contemporary costing
analyses.
4. Chapter III - Unit Equipment and Maintenance Costs
This chapter isolates and evaluates the fixed and
variable costs of ship maintenance, equipment
operation, and supply consumption. The costing
technique that is applied here is compared with those
of other analyses.
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5. Chapter IV - Unit Operating Costs
The thesis isolates the;: j costing sub-categories
whose values may vary with operating time at sea, for
the purpose of eliminating standard cost biases. The
topic is summarized, the individual sub-categories
analyzed and, after the variable cost correction has
been defined, the correction is then applied to the
earlier findings to develop a standardized operating
cost for all ship categories.
6. Chapter V - Unit Cost Summary
This chapter collects each of the individual costs
identified for the ships in this survey and, after
averaging them by class and organization, presents
them in a comparative table format. General
provisions and observations relevant to the summary
costs are included here.
7. Chapter VI - Conclusions
Summarizes the results of this analysis, in terms of
the following:
a. The immediate significance of costs identified by
the survey.
b. Overall evaluation of the costing analyses that
were studied in detail earlier.
c. Summary of new or controversial techniques used by
this thesis.
d. Recommendations and projections.
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8. Appendices
The two appendices provide background information and
supplementary data that contribute to the development
of this thesis or the reader's basic understanding of
the problem:
a. History and Organization of the Naval Reserve
Force
This brief attachment outlines the recent history
and organization of the Naval Reserve Force. It
presents Naval Reserve manning policies and
operating characteristics with particular emphasis
placed upon the Naval Reserve ASW Frigate Program.
b. Characteristics of the FFG-7 and FF-1052 Class
Frigates
Provides unclassified information concerning the
ship classes of which the units in this survey are
a part. More specific information concerning each
of the survey units is also included here, that is
not referred to in the text.
C. THE SCOPE OF UNIT COST ANALYSIS
The first major step that unit cost analysis involves is
to classify each cost according to its organizational
association. Simply, is the cost one that applies solely to
the NRF unit, the active duty unit, or is it a common cost?
In many instances, the nature of these costs is clear: costs
involved with crew training for Selected Reservists on the
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NRF unit are clearly costs chargeable to the NRF account. In
the same manner, basic training for enlistees whose ultimate
duty station is an AD ship might reasonably be debited to
the active account. But wait ... if because the enlistee
serves his enlistment and then joins one of the NRF units
(as a reservist) does the cost of all previous training then
pass to the reserve account?
This thesis will deal directly with questions like this,
and will develop simple, consistent, equitable rules
concerning the association and timing of all costing
elements.
Because this thesis follows in the wake of a number of
other clearly developed studies and statistical models, many
of their elements will apply here; some will not. In the
case of similarity or difference, omission on my part or
theirs, specific reasons will be stated in the Comparative
Analysis found in each sub-category. Major findings will be
recapitulated in the concluding chapter.
As introduced previously, this study will develop and
apply the costing model using data collected that represents
actual force behavior. This thesis diverges from the focus
of previous studies by applying the model as closely as
possible to units assigned to the Naval Reserve and a
sampling of their active duty counterparts. The theoretical
consistencies presented by others and proposed herein will
be tested with the data from ships that have actually
13
operated in the active and reserve environments. To this
end, the following ships were selected for study and
comparison:
1. FFG-7 Class
a. NRF: USS WADSWORTH (FFG-9)
USS DUNCAN (FFG-10)
b. AD: USS JARRETT (FFG-33)
USS CROMMELIN (FFG-37)
2. FF-105? Class
a. NRF: USS GRAY (FF-1054)
USS LANG (FF-1060)
b. AD: USS MEYERKORD (FF-1058)
USS REASONER (FF-1063)
Each of these ships currently operates in the U. S.
Pacific Fleet, all with homeports (with the exception of
Meyerkord and Reasoner) in Long Beach, California. The
remaining two units are homeported in San Diego, California.
Selection of these units was made on the basis of unit
similarity by ship type and homeport location, while the
general operating schedules of each were considered so as to
be representative of force behavior within each organiza-
tion.
14
1 . Ship Type
A critical element in establishing the survey
population was to find ships whose manning and
equipment were generally the same from one unit to
the next. This issue was particularly important from
the start, since the manning required to maintain and
operate the ships, either within the organization or
at a depot level c> is closely associated with the
ship's equipment. Because the backbone of the Naval
Reserve Force consists of FF-1052 and FFG-7 class
frigates, two AD ships of each of these classes were
selected for inclusion in this survey.
2. HpmepQrt Location
For a variety of specific reasons it is more
convenient to select units for comparison that are
geographically colocated in their homeports. While
the Navy enjoys uniformity in many costs and
operations, the incidence of differences in costs is
pervasive, nevertheless. NRF ships assigned to the
Pacific Fleet are presently homeported in Long Beach,
The terms % organizational-level ' and % depot-level ' are
two specific and important categories in both active duty
and reserve ship maintenance and operation. The organiza-
tional-level of operations and maintenance (O&M) is that
work which is conducted by personnel assigned to the
ship's crew. Depot-level maintenance is that which is
conducted by organizations distinctly separate from the
ship, with a ^moderate' repair and overhaul capability.
Repair ships, destroyer tenders, and Shore Intermediate
Maintenance Activities (SIMAs) fall into this category.
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while active duty frigates have homeports as
divergent as Yokosuka (Japan), Pearl Harbor, San
Diego, and Long Beach. Supplemental costs for
personnel travel, fuel, parts, and supporting
personnel (among many others) would be introduced by
selecting units with widely separated homeports, and
may not be wholely isolated and accounted for as
such.
The costing model developed here has three principle
qualities in mind: pertinence, comprehensiveness, and flexi-
bility. An extraordinary number of factors may come into
play when attempting to develop an organizational cost
analysis; some are specifically related to the issue, while
some appear as tangents to the problem. As these tangential
issues are considered, we find that costs begin to merge
with costs that originate with organizations outside of the
survey group. Costs must be consistently isolated ("seg-
mented") for all ships, to gain a true understanding of the
differences that are manifested by each organization's
pol icies.
To counter the issue of pertinence is the equally
critical element of comprehensiveness. Including too few
costing elements may be as troublesome as including too
many. With this in mind, we then ask "Are all costs that
form part of the frigate's operation and maintenance
16
included?" If not, it then becomes important to locate and
isolate that which is missing.
Flexibility is important because it may prove useful in
the future for researchers to compare these techniques, data
sources, and conclusions with their own findings. This study
is designed to provide a useful guide for the researcher
who, five or ten years from now, wants to evaluate
conditions as they then exist. Data has been collected from
unclassified sources available from the commands cited in
each costing category; that which has not been transferred
directly to the unit cost summary has been thoroughly
refined in the Thesis Costing Technique section found in
each sub-category.
This thesis captures the costs that were observed in
Fiscal Year 1986 (October 1985 to September 1986) and uses
values adjusted to FY 1986 dollars. ^ The uniqueness of the
time period and frigates involved means little however; this
is a sample study that can be duplicated with a similar
group and (barring major policy changes) with the same data
elements.
"3
-'Consumer Price Index values provided by Whitney
Culbertson, OPNAV Economic Analysis Branch (0P01B3): 1984 -
3.5%; 1985 - 3.656; 1986 - 0.7% •
^Susan J. Bodilly, Richard Y. Pei, and John F. Schank,
Vpjt Cost AnslYSiS; Annual Recurring Operating and Support
Cost Methodology (Santa Monica, Ca.: The Rand Corporation,
1986), pp. 4-5.
17
The units selected for inclusion in this study are
similar in type and operating behavior with the majority of
the ships in their class and organization. Eight ships were
selected to be able to make comparisons of results at the
level of collection and analysis; the results would prove
meaningless if the resulting values could not be applied to
the five-score ships of the active frigate force that might
have been chosen. To this end, the model seeks to be a
universal one that may be subject to future use and
improvement. J
D. SCOPE OF CURRENT COSTING STUDIES
A number of studies have been conducted in recent years
to estimate the costs associated with ship unit operations
in the Navy's surface warfare and aviation communities.
These studies have provided some answers for questions that
have arisen between Congress and the Pentagon regarding the
needs, costs, and merits of the active and reserve naval
forces.
Studies evaluated by this thesis range from the purely
theoretical to those that have solid accounting foundations.
1 • Unit Cost Analysis; Annual Recurring Operating and
Support Cost Methodology
This paper stands as the primary contemporary
reference in comparative unit costing for active duty
5 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 6.
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and reserve units in the Navy, Air Force, and Army.
It treats the Navy's manning problem in some detail;
it focuses on the numbers and resulting costs derived
from individual manpower authorizations of two
FF-1052 class frigates, and from force-wide averages
for additional manpower costing data, equipment,
maintenance, and operating costs. Cost figures cited
from this work are in FY 1983 dollars.
2. Personnel Costs of Navv Active and Reserve Forces
This study focuses exclusively upon average force
personnel costs. Specific average allowance values
are generated in FY1985 dollars.
3. Visibility and Management of Operating and Support
Costs - Ships (VAMOSC)
Compiled by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA
017E2). A two-volume reference work published
annually, the VAMOSC incorporates accounting data
from a variety of Navy sources to provide a standard
list of summarized costs for all active duty ships.
NRF ships and their associated values are not
included. Costs that are not immediately attributable
to the ship (either because of timing or location)
are also not included. The time period that each
edition of the VAMOSC covers is the pertinent fiscal
year; dollar figures reported are current for the
published date of the VAMOSC.
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4. Navv Program Factors Manual
A product of the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, the NPFM was developed to provide a broad
estimate of the costs in money and manpower required
to operate ships and aircraft. Factors were derived
by using the Navy Resource Model (NARM) and drawing
from data available in the Five Year Defense Plan and
the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). Both direct
and indirect costs were computed in FY 1982 dollars.
Use of the figures in the NPFM generates values that
are applicable to ship and aircraft types for general
planning purposes. ^Because this analysis pre-dates
the transfer of the first frigates to the Naval
Reserve Force, no useful values pertaining to the NRF
units are available here.
5. Frigate Maintenance Man-Hours Comparisons
Using the FY 1983 VAMOSC, Center for Naval Analyses
researchers compared man-hours reported as being used
for organizational- and i n t e r med i a t e - 1 e v e
1
maintenance by AD and NRF FF-1052 class frigates.
Data was aggregated for ships in the Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets. This study is particularly
interesting in its treatment of maintenance personnel
costs.
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navv Program
Factors Manual (Washington. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1980), pp. 2-3.
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6. Enlisted Accessions of Navv Veterans to the Selected
Reserve
This statistical study of Navy veterans of 51 ratings
employed probit analysis. to identify those
significant factors that would positively and
negatively affect affiliation with the Selected
Reserve after completion of the active duty
obligation.
'
7. Economic Analysis Report
A product of "The Assessment Group" (on contract to
OP-162), this statistical analysis provides detailed
information concerning specific average costs for
each of the rates and ratings of Navy personnel.
Values cited are in FY 1984 dollars.
E. FRIGATE MANNING AND OPERATIONS
Active duty and Naval Reserve units have a combination
of full- and part-time personnel assigned to them. In the
case of the active duty ships, the crew is predominantly
composed of full-time personnel, with a small selected
reserve detachment assigned for duty in the event of
mobilization. The Selected Reserve (SELRES) detachment
typically conducts monthly Inactive Duty Training (IDT)
drills on weekends at its hometown Naval Reserve Center,
7Alme 0. Quester, Enlisted Accessions of Navv Veterans
to the Selected Reserve (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval
Analyses, 1983), p. 5.
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with annual Active Duty Training (ACDUTRA) of two weeks'
duration held onboard the ship.
Organizational corrective maintenance is completed by
the active crew; the majority of organizational preventive
maintenance is likewise allocated for active crew accomp-
lishment. SELRES participation in maintenance activities is
usually designed to reacquaint the Reservist with facili-
ties, the Preventive Maintenance System, and the equipment
through "hands-on" training.
Readiness conditions inport and at sea are routinely
within the grasp of the active duty crew, which typically
maintains Watch, Quarter, and Station assignments for all
watch conditions from readiness for immediate combat
(General Quarters), through normal protracted steaming
(Watch Conditions III and IV), and Emergency Bills. The
SELRES detachment is intended to supplement the active crew
for protracted combat readiness while underway. In fact,
while the detachment does provide some relief in numbers and
ratings for underway steaming, their numbers are too few,
with too little organizational experience to dramatically
change any existing watch assignments. This point is worth
emphasizing; the SELRES detachment assigned to each AD ship
may come to play a critical role in the event of a
protracted military campaign. For the purposes of this
thesis however, the AD SELRES detachment is discounted
because their participation in the full range of AD unit
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activities (short of planned war mobilization) is not
significant. For this reason, the costs of AD unit SELRES
manpower are not included in unit manpower costs.
Active duty unit operations dwell on preparation for and
periodic execution of fleet exercises, special operations,
and major overseas deployments of six-seven months' dura-
tion. Within the thesis survey group, three AD ships
(Jarrett, Crommelin, and Meyerkord) operated exclusively in
the Eastern Pacific during FY 1986; the fourth (Reasoner)
participated in a Western Pacific-Indian Ocean deployment
during this time.
Reserve ship manning consists of a combination of
o
Regular Navy, full-time active Naval Reserve (TAR)°» and
SELRES personnel. Congress has mandated^ that no more than
fifty percent of the crews for NRF ships would be composed
of full-time personnel, which would consist exclusively of
TAR reservists. To date, the Navy has not been able to
assign personnel in a manner that would retain these units
in combat and material readiness because:
o
Training and Administration of Reserves. TAR personnel
are full-time reserve officers and enlisted that serve on
active duty. Their charter is to assist in the
administration, recruitment, and training of the Naval
Reserve organization.
'Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, A Report to
the Congress on the Navy's Total Force . (1984), p. D-3.
°Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, A Report to
the Congress on th e Navv's Total Force . (1985), pp. Ill 24-25.
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1. A shortage of TAR officers qualified for surface
warfare duty exists.
2. Selected Reservists have not been on active duty
sufficiently to obtain certain qualifications
available only through lengthy service school
programs.
3. TAR career progression within certain skill groups
have not yet been fully developed.
As a result, full-time manning has been a mix of both
active duty and TAR personnel. Since 1982, the Navy has
taken positive steps to broaden TAR career opportunities.
Likewise, the qualifications programs for some skills have
been "modularized" in a manner that allows Reservists to
continue their technical training when their drill periods
occur.
A substantial portion of the remaining crew vacancies
are allocated to Selected Reservists for manning during
their drill periods and ACDUTRA.
Two additional initiatives exist that improve both
Reserve and unit readiness. First, recent Navy policy
changes have caused at least two independent Naval Reserve
Centers to be contributors to NRF ship manning. The original
SELRES crew was redesignated as the primary crew; manning
1 1 U.S. General Accounting Office, The Extent of Navv
Compliance with Congressional Guidelines on the Training and
Administration of the Reserve (TAR) Program. GAO/NSIAD
85-nq
. (1985), p. 3.
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remained unchanged. A second NAVRESCEN was designated as the
alternate crew. This detachment is to exercise one drill per
quarter and annual ACDUTRA onboard the NRF ship, at a time
that does not coincide with the training of the primary
crew. Either SELRES crew may be designated as the pre-crew
for a new unit joining the NRF, thereby providing a base of
corporate experience in rapidly adjusting the command to NRF
1 2
operations.
Organizational maintenance onboard NRF ships is
completed jointly by the assigned full-time crew (consisting
of active duty and TAR personnel) , the SELRES designated for
assignment, and depot-level personnel specifically
designated to accomplish shipboard maintenance.
Unlike active duty ships, the designed sustainability of
the NRF unit is limited to 96 hours underway when only the
full-time crew is aboard. During those periods in which
either the primary or alternate SELRES crew is onboard,
operational capabilities are only limited by the duration of
the SELRES training period. 1 ^
Underway operations for the NRF units consist primarily
of basic ship drills and underway engineering training. Each
of the NRF ships in this survey have had operating schedules
1 2 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Reserve




^Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Reserve
Manning Policies, Naval message DTG 231925Z May 1985."
(Teleprinted.
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during FY 1986 that included special operations, fleet
exercises, and (in all but one case) overseas port visits.
F. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
While the cost accounting and manpower analysis
addressed in this thesis are designed to provide a compact,
effective analytical device for ship costing, the paper also
tries to link the policies of the Navy in the costing
evaluation. To accomplish this, specific unit costs are
used whenever possible, rather than force averages. The
strength of this costing approach is that it highlights the
real costs that have been incurred from actual ship
operations during the period.
It should become clear early on that just as the char-
acteristics of the Regular Navy and Naval Reserve Force
differ, so to does the manner in which their respective
ships are employed. They exist in their present roles for
different fundamental reasons. "Force decision mixes must
consider both the costs and the wartime capabilities, and
the tradeoffs between them. Other important decision
variables are the peacetime rotation base, deployment
schedules, and legislative constraints. The comparison of
1 ^
annual & S J should not be the sole criterion in mix
Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis , p. 2.
1 5J & S: Operating and Support.
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decisions." That an AD frigate costs more or less than its
NRF counterpart to operate is interesting, but the result
holds little significance unless the reader is willing to
consider the values of force readiness, force training, and
mission compatibility.
16 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 16.
27
II. UNIT MANPOWER COSTS
Unit manpower costs presented in this thesis are based
upon an analysis of the crews of each of the eight frigates
researched in this study. Finding ^manpower costs' is not
simply a process of summing accrued wages; begin first by
thinking of ship manning that involves active duty and
reserve units as being an organizational analysis of six
different personnel systems, each of which administers its
own compensation system. These six systems separately deal
with the officer and enlisted manning programs for USN, TAR,
and SELRES organizations.
A fundamental argument presented by advocates of
expanded NRF participation in national naval affairs has
been that it is substantially less expensive to man an NRF
frigate than its AD counterpart. Is it true? This chapter
will dissect crew compensation categories and (within the
scope of this study) attempt to provide specific answers.
The range of the manpower cost family demands that it be
broken down into specific cost categories, which are listed
as follows:
A. BASIC PAY AMD ALLOWANCES;
B. SEA PAY;
C. UNIQUE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE COSTS;
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D. TRAVEL COSTS;
E. RECRUITING AND INITIAL TRAINING COSTS;
F. SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT BONUSES AND ADVANCED TRAINING
COSTS; and,
G. RETIREMENT COSTS.
These categories are recurring, direct, and largely
fixed in nature.
An issue that should be evaluated before proceeding
further is selecting the reference to be used in costing
ship manning. There are three widely-used references to
chose from: the Manpower (Billet) Authorization, the Navy
Manning Plan (NMP) for the ship, and actual values for those
present onboard.
The Manpower Authorization (OPNAV 1000/2) is published
for each ship, representing a standard manning scheme for
ships of the class. Time analysis studies have been used to
develop standard values for work and watch-standing, which
are reflected through this standard manning plan. The MA is
unaffected by actual Navy manning shortfalls or surpluses.
The other extreme is represented by the Officer
Distribution Control Reports (ODCR), Enlisted Data and
Verification Reports ( EPMAC-EDVR-1080) , and the NRF Manning
Matrix for each ship. These monthly data sheets are
transmitted to each command, representing the actual manning
(both current and projected) for the ship.
Between the standard and actual values are those
presented in the Navy Manning Plan. The NMP is a
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distribution estimate (by rate and rating) of sailors for
each ship, based upon a "fair share" of the total number of
personnel available from each cohort.
The data that is present then, reflects the standard,
the "fair share", and the actual manning conditions for each
of the ships in the survey, and in the Navy.
The Rand study leads the list of comprehensive works
that elect the standard (MA) scheme for unit manpower
costing. Unit Cost Analysis notes that the
programmed levels of unit personnel are used to
represent the cost of average units and to over-
come any personnel constraints due to budget
problems. Therefore, the cost estimates assume
the absence of unit manpower shortfalls and
surpluses. '
This thesis takes a contrary view, and uses actual
manning levels for two reasons:
1. It focuses the costing problem upon the individuals
assigned to the command and not standard manning
levels or force-wide averages.
2. It observes deviations from the authorized manpower
levels, and explains the reasons or implications.
The Manpower Authorization dictates the "authorized"
manning level, but not necessarily the "actual" manning
level, which may be substantially different. Analyses that
have used force-wide averaging techniques have typically
assumed that the manpower authorization document would serve
17 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 5.
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as a reasonable guide for actual unit manning levels. This
assumption is found wanting, because units rarely enjoy
manning levels that duplicate the MA document. They may very
rarely be over-manned and are usually the opposite; addi-
tionally it is not unusual to find shipboard billets filled
by qualified personnel junior in rate to that found in the
manning document. Table I reflects this condition as the
ship's average allowance (the "standard" value) is compared
with the average number of personnel actually assigned.
Because detailed data references are not available in
all categories of this ex post analysis, standard or
force-wide references may be required. Whenever possible
though, this thesis will employ actual manning documents to
develop a finely-focused analysis within the survey group.
The pay, allowances, supplementary bonuses, and
retirement accruals of active duty, TAR, and Selected
Reservists differ substantially from each other. For this
reason, the computation of each manpower cost element
frequently changes, depending upon the personnel category
referred to. The following sections will break down total
manpower costs into individual categories and provide
substantial background material supporting both the cost
computations of other researchers, and the selected techni-
que of this author.
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TABLE I 18
AVERAGE MANNING: ACTUAL VERSUS AUTHORIZED
ALLOW = (The sum of monthly personnel allowances) / 12
ONBD = (The sum of personnel observed onboard monthly) / 12
USN TAR SELRES
ALLOW ONBD ALLOW ONBD ALLOW ONBD
WADSWORTH 98 103.2 20 32.5 69 60
DUNCAN 87.6 107.3 30.4 34.4 69 65.6
Crommelin 205 206 -- —
Jarrett 205 196 — —
GRAY 80 86.1 81 98.2 131 100.4
LANG 80 89.6 81 99.2 129 103.1
Meyerkord 259 255 -- —
Reasoner 266 270 tm _ _ _
Ships accented above experienced average actual manning
variances of 10 percent or greater from average standard
manning levels prescribed by Manpower Authorizations.
l8 Earl Wilson, "NRF Monthly Manning Status, Profile,
and NEC Attainment," Washington, D.C., 1986. (Photocopied.)
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Changes in unit manning resulting from equipment
modifications or personnel policy alterations are considered
to be a part of current organizational behavior and are
included to capture in part, the dynamics of the manpower
problem.
A. BASIC PAY AND ALLOWANCES
Incorporating the individual compensation elements of
basic pay, allowance for quarters, and, where applicable,
variable housing allowance, this category encompasses the
lion's share of the compensation package of the active duty
service member. Payment of this salary is made year-round,
and entitles the member to payment during 30 authorized days
of annual leave.
Among the studies that lead in the evaluation of this
category are works by Rand Corporation, the Center for Naval
Analyses, and the VAMOSC.
1
. current ?tv,die§ Costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
Schank, Bodilly, and Pei used the pay and
allowance totals of the Navy Department's
Justification of Estimates for Fiscal Year 1984.
Military Personnel. Navv 19 and divided by average
active duty officer and enlisted strength to
develop an average cost per individual in each
^Hereafter referred to as Justifications .
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category. The cost per unit was derived by multi-
plying the result by the officer or enlisted
personnel levels cited in the contemporary unit
Manpower Authorization Form ( 1000/2). 20
In much the same manner as for active duty
personnel, the total TAR payroll has been drawn
from Justifications , divided by the average total
TAR strength, and multiplied by TAR manning as
reflected by the Manpower Authorization reports of
each command.
Because Selected Reservists draw pay and
allowances for only that time in which they are
drilling, the uniformity of active duty and TAR
payroll estimates is not reflected here. Schank
and associates derived an effective means of cost
estimation by referring to the USNR Personnel
Resources Branch (NOP-09R32) for estimates of
costs per drill for IDT periods and costs per day
?
1
for active duty training.
b. VAMOSC
The VAMOSC includes the basic pay and allowance
elements and has also added "other" entitlements
and government contributions to FICA and the
Servicemen's Group Life Insurance program. In
on
^ u Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis , p. 10.
21 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, pp. 111-112.
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doing so, it has summed the specific pay figures
for each officer and enlisted assigned to the ship
during the year and has then reported this value.
In effect, the total payroll of the ship has been
incorporated in one, all-inclusive value.
Because NRF units are not included in explicit
VAMOSC costing (as of FY 1986), there is no
measure of the basic pay for the active duty, TAR,
or SELRES personnel assigned to these commands.
c. Feldman Study
The Feldman study has calculated costs per officer
and enlisted within active duty and TAR ranks,
based upon summed values of individual pay and
allowances drawn from Justifications . This has
then been divided by average force strengths for
officers and enlisted personnel.
Costs cited for TAR personnel in the reference
included both flight and sea pays; neither could
be effectively extracted from the overall costs
and are uncorrected in the subsequent analysis.
Feldman observed that "TAR pay and allowances
factors are higher than those of active -duty
personnel because the TAR pay-grade structure is
Ronald Feldman, Personnel Costs of Navv Active and
Reserve Forces (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses,
1985), p. 3.
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skewed towards the higher grades". ^ (This
statement will prove particularly important as the
thesis investigates the average compensation of
crewmen on each of the survey ships.)
The Feldman analysis noted that SELRES pay and
allowance factors in Justifications were tainted
with the average retirement contribution of all
Navy personnel. While more will be said about the
actuarial nature of the retirement system, Feldman
extracted the retirement factor entirely to obtain
a total pay value for SELRES personnel. This value
was then divided by average strengths to find a
cost per SELRES officer and enlisted.
2. Thesis Costing Technique
As has been mentioned already, this costing
sub-category has been particularly interesting in
developing a working methodology for because it has
demanded an understanding of and data for six
inter-related pay schemes.
No one source in the Navy exists to identify the
total pay and allowances for the Regular, TAR, and
SELRES sailors of a selected ship. Worse still, many
authorities that hold data are unable to tell the




included in their data base, whether the data
represents base pay alone (or with allowances), or
whether the data includes direct disbursements only
or electronic funds transfers as well. This is not to
imply that these diligent personnel are unaware of
what they control; rather, since the pay schemes are
inter-woven so closely, it is difficult to isolate
and validate the presence or absence of any given
category of sailors.
This thesis used two independent data sources to
provide information relating to the Regular Navy and
TAR pay and allowances. The first source was a
cumulative pay and allowances summary provided by the
Finance/Comptroller Department of the administrative
("Type") commander of these ships. -> The second
reference was a "snapshot" of total active duty pay
and allowances provided by the Navy Finance Center
(NAVFINCEN)
.
Costing for the 3ELRES detachment of each NRF ship
followed a different path. Selected Reservists
receive base pay on a scale equivalent to that of
their Active Duty counterparts, which is structured
around the pay grade and time-in-grade of each sailor
and officer. SELRES are only paid on the basis of
-^Commander, Naval Surface Forces Pacific, referred to
hereafter as COMNAVSURFPAC.
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their drill time; each four hour drill completed
yields one day's base pay. Four drills are typically
conducted during each weekend Inactive Duty Training
period; these, in turn, are conducted twelve times
each year.
The participation rate reflects the average value of
"regular" and "equivalent training" drills cited on
unit Naval Reserve Drill Pay Earnings Statement
Reports. Add to this the 14 days of base pay received
as a result of participating in the two-week annual
ACDUTRA, and the sum is the base pay received by the
individual reservist each year. Figure 1 steps
through this costing process.
Using this as a guide, the thesis used the Reserve
Manning Matrices of each NRF frigate to identify the
appropriate pay scale of all participating
reservists.
3. Data
This category includes the base pay, allowances,
entitlements, and contributions to FICA and SGLI for
all personnel assigned to each of the commands in the
survey. Sources of
data for Regular Navy and TAR personnel were
COMNAVSURFPAC and NAVFINCEN. Cumulative values for
each NRF SELRES detachment were calculated using the
technique noted above, and are included in the
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48 paid drills per year (48 days base pay)
+
Annual Active Duty Training (14 days base pay)
62 days base pay
x
Average Participation Rate (0.89)
55.2 davs base oav per SELRES per year
55.2 days / 30 days per month = 1.84 months pay per year
x
Average Monthly SELRES Payroll
UNIT SELRES ANWVAL 9AS5 PAY
Figure 1: SELRES Annual Base Pay Calculation
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following totals. Also included are SELRES detachment
sea pay values referred to in the next sub-category.












One of the fundamental arguments favoring the
expansion of the Naval Reserve Force has been that
the economies resulting from the transfer of active
duty billets to the reserves would yield enormous
savings in the manpower account. The results
illustrated here indicate that the savings may be
more modest than anticipated.
There are two principal factors that appear to have
contributed to the escalation of NRF manning costs
during FY 1986:
1. While the AD ships have manned at levels very
close to their standard manning rates, NRF units
were substantially over-staffed with active duty
personnel throughout the year.
Using data from Table I, the following percentages
Values have been averaged and transferred to the Unit
Cost Summary on page 178.
40
represent the average active duty manning levels





Active duty personnel represent expensive human
assets, which is reflected here by a substantial
increase in each ship's total pay and allowances.
Interestingly, it should be noted here that
studies that use standard manning levels for unit
personnel costing would not be able to detect
this, or many of the following specific costing
deviations that actually occur.
2. Manning individual active duty billets onboard NRF
units is at least as costly as manning the billets
of the AD ship. To dramatize this statement,
consider the average annual total of pay and

















More than $5500 separate the highest average pay
from that of the lowest. More noteworthy still is
the fact that the labor intensive FF-1052 class is
split, by organizations, at the extremes; the
implication here is that while the rating profiles
of the corresponding ships are similar, the
t ime-in-grade (and resulting pay levels) of the
average sailor assigned to the billet are skewed
in favor of the NRF units. Although data is not
available here to substantiate this hypothesis,
Feldman's earlier findings— that TAR pay exceeds
that of the Regular Navy counterpart—may well be
accurate through contribution to a higher average
crew pay.
The studies by Rand and CNA have perhaps greater
application in a predictive force-wide model, where using
average values may more surely reflect the characteristics
of the force as a whole, or where collecting specific unit
values may prove ungainly. For the purposes of a small
survey population, the discoveries that result from an
intimate analysis of the behavior of individual ships and
personnel groups appear to make the endeavor worthwhile.
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B. SEA PAY
Career sea pay is a supplementary allowance authorized
to personnel assigned to sea duty, recognizing the arduous
nature of this activity. Active duty and TAR personnel are
entitled to this pay while assigned to the ship, as are
Selected Reservists while conducting active duty training
onboard either AD or NRF units. ' Selected Reservists do not
receive sea pay while conducting regular or additional
drills.
While this thesis includes the costs of sea pay in the
Basic Pav and Allowances sub-category, treatment of the
topic as a separate entity by other references merits
specific attention here.
1. Current Studies Costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
The Rand group arrived at their cost for active
duty sea pay by isolating the total allowance for
officers and enlisted found in Justifications . and
dividing by the average manning strength of each
group within the year.
Rand has not isolated sea pay costs for TAR
personnel. This cost has been integrated with the
total budget allocated for TAR pay and allowances
27tf Herbert A. Bartholomew and Robert R. Morris, Military
Compensation Background Papers: Compensation Elements and
Related Manpower Cost Items (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1982), pp. 144-145.
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for officers and enlisted, which has then been
divided by total TAR strength for the year to
obtain an average value of compensation *
Sea pay contributions to Naval Reservists have
been found by multiplying average costs per day
(provided by the USNR Personnel Resources Branch
(NOP-09R32)) by 14 (representing total days of
annual shipboard training) and then by the
observed participation rate (again provided by the
USNR PRB).
b. VAMOSC
This document included the sea pay category within
its summary cost expression (elements 1.1.1,2 and
1.1.1.3) derived from the Joint Uniform Military
Pay System (JUMPS) 29 for active duty frigates
crews only. NRF unit crews have not been
considered by this document. As a result, the
VAMOSC has little value in this comparative
analysis.
c. Feldman Study
An average sea pay for active duty personnel was
developed using the summary cost of AD sea pay
p o
Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis , pp.
115-116.
29 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA 017E2),
Visibility ana Management of Operating and Support Costs -
Ships . 2 vols., (Washington, D.C.: n.p., 1986), pp. A 5-6.
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from Justifications and the total number of
sea-rated officers and enlisted personnel in the
Navy. 3° TAR sea pay costs are incorporated in the
average cost figure that was derived for TAR pay
and allowances.-* Estimated per-capita sea pay
values for the Selected Reserve elements were
obtained directly from 0P-09R.
d. Economic Analysis Report
This analysis provided an average value of sea pay
distributions to personnel, with each estimate
classified by rate, rank, and rating.
2. Thesis Costing Technique
Sea pay was incorporated with the Regular Navy and
TAR basic pay and allowance calculations completed in
the previous sub-category.
SELRES personnel are eligible for career sea pay when
performing active duty training only; as a result,
for their 14 days of training each year, the monthly
3 p
rates payable-" .are multiplied by 0.46667 (repre-
senting 14 of 30 days). Participating SELRES
personnel have been identified from the NRF Manning
Matrix, and the resulting sea pay calculated from
30
31
Feldman, Personnel Costs, p. 6.
Feldman, p. 6.
op
J Commander , Navy Military Personnel Command, Adminis-
trative Procedures for Naval Reservists on Inactive Duty.
BUPERSINST 5400. 4?F . (1986), p. V-1-4.
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this information. Individual SELRES sea pay
computations have been summed and included with the
basic pay and allowances reflected in the previous
sub-category.
Selected Reserve Sea Pay Estimate (FY 86 dollars)
Wadsworth: 3049 Gray: 5818
Duncan: 3347 Lang: 5818
3. Comparative Analysis
Leading analyses rely upon force averages to provide
a sea pay appropriate for the individual sailor.
Their techniques differ slightly: the Rand study
group used Navy-wide averages and cumulative sea pay
disbursements to produce an average value. This may
generate a figure that is lower than that actually
received by active duty personnel, because only a
portion of all Navy officers and enlisted serve at
sea (and receive the appropriate pay) at any one
time. The Feldman study appears to close in on an
accurate active duty sea pay average by focusing on
personnel qualified for sea duty; again, not all
personnel that are eligible for sea duty were
actually serving and being paid for it in 1986.
The VAMOSC provides sea pay data for active duty
units as provided by those units to the Navy Finance
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Center; as an archival tool, the VAMOSC appears to
have the best accuracy. Unfortunately, the scope of
this study does not include the NRF units. As an
analytical tool, the Economic Analysis Report appears
to have a sound base, using historical sea pay
disbursements by rate and rating to develop an
individual pay value for each cohort.
C. UNIQUE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE COSTS
This costing sub-category applies only to NRF units, and
deals exclusively with specific manpower issues unique to
these ships which create other additional personnel costs
that have not yet been considered by this thesis.
An "additional cost" element develops when the SELRES
detachment is called upon to perform additional paid drills
in excess of the number mandated as part of normal annual
training.
"The primary purpose of an additional drill is to
provide the opportunity to obtain required training for
mobilization readiness which cannot be accomplished with
regular scheduled annual drills. "" Under this charter, the
primary, alternate, and precrews of NRF ships are authorized
to exceed the 48 paid drills scheduled for each year, in
order to take advantage of special training opportunities
33
-'-'Commander, Navy Military Personnel Command, Aj
trative Procedures, p. III-1-A-1.
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and to achieve required skill qualifications.
If the unit Commanding Officer considers it necessary,
SELRES personnel assigned to the primary detachment may be
called upon to report for up to 30 additional drills.
Precrew and alternate crew personnel may receive pay for 4
oh
additional drills during the year. J Because of the substan-
tial costs that arise from conducting each additional drill,
the ship must demonstrate a correlation between need for the




Current Studies Costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
The Rand group costed additional drills by
separately calculating the average cost of base
pay for officers and enlisted assigned to NRF
units. This value was then multiplied by the
number of personnel in the detachment and then by
the historic participation rate of the detachment
for regular drills. This product was then
multiplied by 30, the maximum number of additional
drills permissible for the primary detachment for
the year.
2. Thesis Costing Technique
The Naval Reserve Drill Pay Earnings Statement Report
is an automated monthly summary expense sheet
34 Commander, Navy Military Personnel Command, p. III-1-A-3.
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provided by NAVFINCEN to each SELRES detachment,
citing the number of drills (by category) that each
reservist participated in during the preceding month,
and the appropriate disbursements that each received.
For the data used by this thesis, Earnings Statement
Reports were sampled to identify the average number
of additional drills per unit and the average pay
received by participants during each additional
drill. These values were then multiplied by the
average SELRES detachment strength of each unit to
provide the values noted in the model below.
Unique NRF Costs 35
Unit SELRES Additional Additional Total
Crew Pav/Drill Drills Ati<T 1 PSY
Wadsworth 60 40,240




Within the boundaries of this thesis survey group,
several interesting observations have emerged
concerning the cost of additional SELRES drills:
-^Values have been averaged and transferred to the Unit
Cost Summary on page 178.
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1. The costs are non-trivial. The average pay
disbursement for each reservist for each
additional drill was $66.60.
2. Actual attendance at additional drills ranged from
the minimum (zero) to the maximum permissible (30)
within the detachments. There was a tendency for
senior personnel to attend substantially more
drills than junior personnel, which contributed
significantly to the high average drill costs
noted above.
With no data sources available at the headquarters
level to isolate these "additional" drills costs, the
best source of information remains the Earnings
Statement Reports used here. Each provides explicit
data on pay disbursements and drills performed by
each sailor.
A troublesome aspect of the Rand calculation is
that while it may hold accurate for the large
number of reservists considered force-wide, it is
unlikely that it will accurately reflect the
specific training policies of the individual
SELRES detachments. Neither does it take into account
the higher absentee rate that accompany additional
drill periods, which were observed here. Remember
that reserve duty is a ^moonlight' activity—not the
principal occupat ion--of the Reservist. Additional
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drills may be scheduled on short notice, and as a
result may interfere with the professional or
personal interests of the Reservist.
The Rand analysis of additional drill costs has two
liabilities when applied to this survey: in general,
costs of additional drills are maximized (perhaps
unnecessarily) and in this specific case, the average
costs that are derived do not necessarily reflect the
behavior of each SELRES detachment or the parent NRF
command
.
The general problem arises from the fact that the
Rand calculations cost both SELRES officers and
enlisted for the maximum number of additional
drill days permissible (30) and at a participation
rate that the study itself admits may be inordin-
ately high.-^ To illustrate this problem, let us
use the sample reserve officer found in the Rand
study, who participates in 99 percent of all 30
additional drills. The resulting cost of this
officer's services for one year are as follows:









$83.47 .99 30 $2479
What happens if this officer more realistically
participates in 60 percent of 5 additional drills?
The annual value becomes:
$83.47 .60 $250
The result is a cumulative annual cost that is
only 10 percent of the projected cost.
The point to be made here is that both the number
of authorized additional drills and the absentee
rate for these drills figure significantly in the
total annual costs in this sub-category. While the
ideal solution here is to sum additional drill
payments for the crew, a very good alternative
exists when the rank/rate profile, average
participation rate, and number of additional
drills of FY 1986 for each SELRES detachment are
known.
Because the scope of the Rand study is force-wide,
deriving an average cost value is reasonable and
should be accurate. The scope of this thesis is
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such that the available information on individual
SELRES crew strength, absenteeism, and training
programs results in a much more accurate solution.
D. TRAVEL COSTS
Travel costs refer to the costs associated with moving
military personnel to and from their duty stations for
accession, training, rotation, and separation.
_
Within this cost analysis, there are three general cate-
gories that will be evaluated: the cost of transferring
full-time personnel from another assignment location to one
of the frigates in the survey (Permanent Change of Station,
or PCS); the expenditure of funds allocated for shipboard
personnel to travel afield for official business (Temporary
Additional Duty, or TAD); and the funds required for
Selected Reservists assigned to NRF units to attend ship's
drills and training activities.
These costs include those involved with the physical
movement of the crewmember (for PCS and TAD moves) and for
their dependents and personal effects (as is the case with
PCS moves). Among the costs that arise in transferring the
individual with PCS are per diem reimbursements for personal
and dependent travel, private vehicle shipment, temporary
lodging, and movement of household goods.
PCS moves are an inherent part of the career of the
active duty and TAR s erv ic emember . Costs are incurred in
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transferring the sailor from the recruiting location to the
training command upon accession, and to the home of record
upon completion of obligated service. In between, the costs
that arise for travel to the unit, to supplementary training
schools, to subsequent shore duty assignments or ships, and
for changes of the unit's homeport all contribute to the
costs associated with this sub-category. All costs are
considered in the Navy-wide Permanent Change of Station data
found in Table II.
The TAD costing sub-category includes general expenses
incurred as a result of travel and lodging used, incidental
to specific administrative or training missions in support
of the command at a location remote to the ship. The
activities that result in TAD assignment (and appropriate
compensation for expenses incurred) include participation in
Navy training programs, factory-sponsored equipment schools,
conferences, meetings, and in selected instances, for
individual transportation home when a death in the immediate
family occurs.
The costs of PCS moves are generated by active duty and
TAR personnel; all three personnel categories contribute to
TAD costs.
1 . Current Studies Costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
The Rand group drew PCS costs from Justifications
and divided by average force strength to obtain an
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TABLE II








Unit moves 7,051 $3471.42
Total Moves 318,931
Composite Average Costs — $1855.38
Net of Unit Moves (7,051)
Adjusted Total and Average 311,880 $1818.84
average cost of personnel travel. 3 TAR travel was
also taken from Justifications . and then divided
by overall TAR strength to derive an average TAR
travel value.
In much the same manner as for the TAR community,
-"U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations, Military and Civilian Manpower and
Compensation Programs. 99th Cong., 2nd sess., 1986, p. 399.
3°Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis , p. 116.
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Rand drew total travel values for reservists from
Justifications and averaged for the total reserve
strength,
b. VAMOSC
This document summed costs of travel, allowances,
per diem, and additional miscellaneous charges for
AD units under the heading of TAD expenses,
without isolating costs of PCS movement. ^9 (pes
costs are viewed by VAMOSC as being extraordinary
costs unassociated with the individual active duty
command.) No costs related to NRF travel are
noted
.
2. Thesis Costing Technique
Research done directly with the PCS Budget Cost
Branch (NMPC-712) indicated that the total FY 1986
budget for active duty PCS moves (including the
movement of household goods) was $568,536,000. Using
this figure, the adjusted average value for PCS moves
was $1822.93. This secondary source confirms the
adjusted average (from Table II) to be an accurate
measure for individual PCS moves.
The PCS costing calculated in this thesis uses
appropriate Enlisted Data Verification Reports and
Officer Distribution Control Reports to identify
39 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA 017E2),
VAMOSC . p. A-7.
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full-time enlisted personnel and officers joining
individual commands in FY 1986. The sum of these
figures is then multiplied by $1820 to produce an
average cost of PCS tailored for each frigate.
This thesis explores the problem of PCS and TAD
costing from two separate tangents. For PCS costing,
the number of service-wide moves observed in FY 1986
was identified by category and averaged. This value
has then been multiplied by the average number of
active duty personnel assigned to each command.
The limited survey size of the thesis has allowed
specific costs to» be drawn from the Type Commander
(COMNAVSURFPAC) for TAD travel, for both active and
reserve units. This data is listed in Table III.
TABLE III









40 Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific, "FY 85 and FY
86 0PTAR ana TADTAR Study for Ship Class - FF and FFG," and
"Prospective C0/X0 Brief Sheets," San Diego, Ca., 1986.
Providing the solution for the total travel budget of
each ship, by class and organization, was done by
computing the unit PCS value for 1986, and then
adding to this the TADTAR of each ship:
TABLE IV
TOTAL TRAVEL COSTS
Average' PCS Cost x Number of Arrivals in FY 86
+ TAD Travel Costs
= Total Unit Travel Costs 41
AVG NUMBER PCS COST TAD COST TOTAL
AD FF-1052 113 .5 206,570 12,421 218,991
NRF FF-1052 100 182,000 21 ,000 203,000
AD FFG-7 72 131 ,040 31,417 162,457
NRF FFG-7 72 131 ,040 14,200 145,240
3. Compff.rat JJLfi—&ZLSLUr 2I5
The differences that lie between other analyses and
this thesis include:
a. The thesis explicitly cites household goods
shipment as a costing element included in the
costing model; the Rand study does not.
4
1
Values transferred to the Unit Cost Summary on page
178.
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b. The thesis averages based upon observed AD, TAR,
and SELRES strengths in each unit, with the ODCR,
EDVR, and SELRES training matrices of each unit as
guides. The Rand study finds total unit costs in
this category based upon the values in the
appropriate MA document.
c. Actual TAD costs for each unit are cited in the
thesis; average values are used by other sources.
The study that seeks to analyze the costs associated
with travel costs for assigned personnel almost
immediately becomes involved in the compromise of the
accuracy that it always seeks to retain. The reasons
and instances in which government travel take place
are myriad. Table II lists only the categories for
PCS moves; many other specific reasons besides those
identified here exist for TAD travel.
Fortunately, the funding associated with TAD travel
is aggregated by the Type Commander by individual
units and is cited herein. On the other hand, the
author was not so lucky as to find a data management
system that classified the 318,931 PCS moves by ship
and fiscal year. The average PCS value cited ($1820),
when taken with the number of personnel arriving at
each command, should provide a very comfortable
approximation. This study benefits from having a
manageable sample size, which yielded an average
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value at least as accurate as that found in the Rand
study for PCS moves.
The data matrices above yield the required individual
unit values for the summary cost equation. They have
more to say, however:
1. Units assigned to San Diego have substantially
lower TAD costs for the year. When corrected for
emergency leave cases that occurred overseas, USS
Reasoner expended $7150. This, when coupled with
Meyerkord's TAD expenses, resulted in an average
TAD cost of $8072.50. By contrast, the average
cost of TAD travel for Long Beach units was
$22,206. Clearly, the San Diego-based ships
benefited from their proximity to training
facilities and major Pacific Fleet commands.
While this is not the forum to evaluate the
dispersed homeporting scheme for Pacific Fleet
units, it is reasonable to expect that the TAD
expenses for both AD and NRF units will remain
higher (and perhaps, substantially so) as frigates
go further afield to homeports in San Francisco
and Everett, Washington.
2. Interestingly, TAD expenses for USS Jarrett and
Crommelin were significantly higher than those for
the four NRF frigates. The nature of this study is
such that this observation cannot be fully
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evaluated, but it is interesting to wonder whether
there is substance behind these numbers. If all
Long Beach-based units were able to maintain
satisfactory training levels in FY 1986 with the
TAD obligations that they received, then the
disposition of Naval Reserve Force ships at the
dispersed homeports noted above may show some cost
savings over moving their AD sisters.
E. RECRUITING AND INITIAL TRAINING COSTS
A generous proportion of the personnel assigned to AD
and NRF units are first-term enlistees. While the Navy
incurs a continuing expense in paying salaries and
allowances for these men (which have already been captured
by this model), some costs were generated before their
arrival at the command in their recruitment and training.
Each member of the command represents a portion of the
ship's total human assets; the costs that the Navy observes
in preparing these individuals for naval service then become
part of the total cost of frigate operations. To fully
develop the costs involved in ship operations for the year
then, the costing model must consider expenses incurred
outside of both Fiscal Year 1986 and the surveyed commands.
42 Officers and enlisted serving under their initial
military obligation are hereafter referred to as "first-
term" personnel. Those that elect to extend or reenlist are
referred to as "career" personnel. Career personnel are
dealt with in the next section.
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1 . Current Studies Costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
Rand used unit losses as the basis for active and
reserve training costs. The goal in using losses
was to "overcome any influences of planned growth
in personnel strength".-^ Total active force
enlisted and officer losses were divided by total
force strength to derive a "turnover rate".
Training cost factors (which include recruiting,
basic training, and initial technical training)
were derived for a variety of enlisted ratings
previously considered ^ ' Advanced technical ( % C)
school costs were not available for this study.
Active officer recruitment and training costs were
obtained by multiplying the average number of
non-rated 46 officers by the officer turnover
rate, and then by multiplying this value by a
"ship officer training cost" factor.
Losses once again were the determining factors in




Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis , pp. 121-122.
Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 123.
Ellen Balis and Deborah Clay-Mendez, Replacement
Costs for Navv First-Term Personnel, bv Rating (Alexandria,
Va«: Center for Naval Analyses, 1982), pp. 3-8 passim.
b Non-rated officers are those in the Rand study that
are not trained for flying duty.
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which in this case referred to TAR personnel. The
fact that most NRF billets afloat were filled by
personnel with a prior f i r s t -e n 1 i s t me n
t
affiliation had a substantial impact on the
similarity between active and reserve costing
within this category.
Rand researchers used a costing technique very
similar to that which they employed for active
duty recruitment and training, with one essential
difference: all SELRES personnel with prior
military service were excluded from these costs.
The influence of this factor on total costs is
substantial; Schank and associates observed that
only 8.2 percent of enlisted and 17.5 percent of
officers in the Selected Reserve had been inducted
directly into reserve service. (By comparison,
similar figures for active duty personnel were 100
percent for both categories.)
The Rand study group observed that when factored
with losses, the "turnover rate" of SELRES
enlisted personnel was approximately 1/7 that of
active duty, while a similar officer ratio was
approximately one-half. Because of their relative
minority in both AD and NRF frigates, the
resulting cost values for recruitment and training
were much closer in the final calculations;
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$110,000 and $80,000 per annum for each AD and NRF
officer, respectively. Similar enlisted figures
were $960,000 and $380,000 for AD and NRF ships. 47
b. VAMOSC
This document included costs for X C' and % F'
schools in the annual cost summary. It does not
consider costs that occurred before the
publication's fiscal year and is not cumulative in
its effects upon the individual crewmember's
training costs. As a result, the VAMOSC provides a
clear ^snapshot' of fiscal year AD ship training
costs, but little more.
c. Economic Analysis Report
This study breaks down the costs of accession and
training as individual elements into a total cost
and compensation matrix for rates and ratings of
Navy personnel. The technique used for costing
here— to spread out costs over the expected period
of useful service--is similar to that employed by
this thesis.
2. Thesis Costing Technique,
All personnel onboard each command during FY 1986
47 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis, pp
119-123, 136, 137.
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are costed for their preliminary recruitment and
training in this sub-category.
This approach to personnel costing is a significant
departure from the methods employed by previous
researchers, because it distributes the costs of
acquisition and training evenly over the individual's
enlistment period. The redistribution only makes
sense. No study would attempt to say that the annual
cost of ship's operations should include the expense
of constructing and fitting out that ship; why then
do this for the personnel that man her?
SELRES personnel are costed for the training
appropriate to their rate and rating or rank and
specialty. This places a significant additional
cost upon the reserve account and eases the burden
that other researchers place upon the active account.
The redistribution is justifiable based upon the
results of recent Navy policy. One variable that the
Navy has had the opportunity to change in order to
improve SELRES affiliation rates has been the length
of the universal military training obligation. In
changing the obligation from six to eight years in FY
no
A clear demarkation line exists for most personnel at
the end of their initial military obligation. Junior
officers typically receive post-graduate or specialty
educations, while many AD enlisted personnel reenlist for
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and advanced training. These
cases are considered in the next sub-category.
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1985, a specific benefit was to take advantage of
UQ
study results 7 that indicated that the likelihood of
post-active duty affiliation in Navy ratings would
increase with an additional service obligation, at no
significant cost in active duty enlistments lost.
This action inexorably linked the enlistee with both
the active duty and reserve elements of the Navy,
because the required span of active service would
only be four to six years of this period.
Figure 2 reflects the change in first-term personnel
flows that this policy has caused. Traditionally, the
sailor that elected not to reenlist was discharged
from active service with no constructive time
remaining for required reserve affiliation (Flow A).
With a longer obligatory service period, Flow B
became a significant entity.
The model that this thesis uses is a dynamic one
(much like Rand's) in that the actual unit strength,
rather than the standard manning level, is the focal
point in calculating costs. The limited survey size
allows each unit to be examined at current manning
levels, rather than exclusively for its losses in the
manner that the Rand group does. These personnel can,
in turn, be identified by their rate and rating or
rank and sub-specialty.
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Figure 2: First-Term Personnel Assignment Paths
50 SAM/0SAM ( 2.ea-Air-Mariner/p_f f icer S.ea-Air-Mar iner )
refers to new Naval Reserve induction programs instituted in
1984, that allow direct access for personnel into the Naval
Reserve after completing basic training and initial schools.
These programs had no influence upon this study, although
they well might as the programs mature.
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In dealing specifically with the initial military
obligation of both officers and enlisted personnel,
the solution here is to charge that fraction of
initial recruitment and training costs to the unit
(active or NRF) to which the sailor is affiliated. As
an example, the billet that is filled onboard an NRF
unit with a first-term enlistee whose average cost of
recruitment and training is $10,000 causes a charge
of $1250 ($10,000 / 8) to be levied upon the command
in this costing sub-category.
The "current costs" of unit operation include those
that induce the individual to affiliate with the
command. Current pay and allowances, prospects for
advancement, bonuses, and additional training are the
tangible and intangible factors that become important
here. The costs of initial screening and training are
placed upon the individuals assigned to each command
on an amort i.zed basis consistent with the method
previously described.
Officer accessions to surface ships require consid-
erably more preparation for duty after initial
military induction. A consideration in applying costs
for junior officers begins by identifying the number
associated with the surveyed ships that are still
serving their period of initial military obligation.
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Several considerations enter into the officer cost
equation here:
a. "All officers are not created equal"
Costs of advertising and initial induction may be
considered equal among officers, but the
"pipeline" to the ship may vary widely in cost,
depending upon the source of each undergraduate
degree. Naval Academy graduates carry a
substantially higher taxpayer pricetag than either
ROTC or Officer Candidate School graduates.
b. Induction costs
Induction costs may be different for officers,
depending upon their pipeline source date. Typi-
cally, Naval Academy and NROTC four-year
scholarship induction costs are incurred in the
fifth fiscal year prior to assignment to the ship.
Recipients of RCTC two-year scholarships incur
processing costs in the third fiscal year prior to
ship assignment. OCS graduate processing may be
done largely in the fiscal year immediately prior
to commissioning.
The initial skill and specialty training for
officers comes shortly after preliminary training
at the Academy, OCS, or ROTC. For unrestricted
line officers, the uniform path takes all entrants
through the basic course at the Surface Warfare
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Officer School and then into follow-on specialty
courses in ASW, missile, navigation, or propulsion
training. Junior supply officers attend the basic
course at the Supply Officer's School before ship
assignment.
Values for enlisted first-term personnel were
drawn from the Enlisted Distribution and
Verification Reports of individual commands.
Officer values were taken from individual unit
Officer Distribution Control Reports.
TABLE V















The numbers cited above reflect sailors received
between 1 October 1985 and 30 September 1986.
Initial enlistment dates for these personnel are
aggregated by fiscal year in Table VI.
First-term personnel were identified using the
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ODCR, EDVR, and NRF Manning Matrices of each
command. These individuals were then costed using
the Economic Analysis Report, applying the values
noted under matrix entries "accession" and
"initial training". Results were summed and
averaged by ship type and organization, as is
noted below.
Selected Reservists were identified using
individual Enlisted Unit Profile Reports
(CHNAVRES-NRPC-1080-1363) and costed in a manner
similar to that described for AD personnel.
TABLE VI
SURVEY ENLISTED RECRUITMENT DISTRIBUTION
FY81 FY82 FY8? FY84 FY85 FY86
FF-1052 Class (AD)
:
FF-1052 Class (NRF) :
FFG-7 Class (AD):
FFG-7 Class (NRF):
1 6 13 46 68 20
6 12 74 10
1 7 9 16 27 6
2 4 8 14 24 22
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Because the techniques used by this thesis vary
widely from other capable evaluations, the specific
differences in analysis are worth explaining:
a. The thesis explores unit manning levels, subject
to current year fluctuations; others evaluate
losses. Fundamental to the nature of this study is
the cost of individuals actually assigned to the
command. These are either the arrivals within the
fiscal year or those that are incumbents; the
reasons for their assignment are only of secondary
importance to the fact that they are there.
Measuring losses injects a dynamic influence into
an otherwise static model, but it does not truly
capture the essence of the accession costing
problem by solely examining attritions.
b. Cost analysis made by this thesis assumes that the
costs of recruitment and initial training are
recouped by the Navy over the course of the
-'Values have been transferred to the Unit Cost Summary
on page 178.
72
enlistment, a fraction of which is FY 1986. Other
studies use a "block purchase" technique that, in
essence, attempts to cost all cumulative human
investments made by the Navy to date. This
approach has its merits— it does provide the
reader with a notion of the investment made in
human capital—but it is not a practice that is
done on a consistent basis throughout the entire
unit costing analysis. This study solely considers
the costs that emerge within a specific
("annualized") block of time.
c. This study applies the costs of accession and
training to the current beneficiary, which is the
AD unit, NRF unit, or the SELRES detachment. The
Rand study elected to place the burden of initial
training costs on the AD unit, as the prime
beneficiary of the initial enlistment. What
follows from this is that SELRES personnel bound
for shipboard duty possess skills which should be
available at an unskilled wage rate, because their
previous training presumably carries no implicit
value. Such a conclusion is hardly realistic.
d. Both the Rand study and this thesis isolate costs
in this category for averaging; the associated
costs of PCS and TAD travel associated with
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transportation after accession and training costed
under the travel cost category.
Rand views that recruitment and initial training
costs should be borne by the initial beneficiary
of that training, which in nearly all cases, is
the active duty unit. The legitimacy of this
argument was strong (but not impervious) when the
military obligation associated with the first
enlistment was six years; by FY 1986 the
obligatory service period for all accessions was
eight years--the active enlistment considerably
less--and the mandatory enrollment in a component
of the Naval Reserve for first-term enlistees a
matter of fact.
One question remains: why are NRF acquisition and
training costs greater than those of their AD
counterparts? The answer here appears to lie in
the fact that a majority of personnel in each
SELRES detachment are serving out the remainder of
their UMO with the NRF. Using USS Duncan as an
example, 49 personnel in the detachment were
first-term personnel (from the detachment average
strength of 65.6) of which 12 had joined the
detachment during FY 1986.
Given that we find a higher proportion of
first-term personnel serving in each ship's SELRES
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detachment than in the full-time crew, we may then
expect that costs associated with career
acquisition and training for the SELRES will be
proportionally less.
F. SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT BONUSES AND ADVANCED TRAINING
The previous section targeted costs associated with the
recruitment and initial training of each ship's crew. A
substantial fraction of any ship's crew is composed of
individuals that chose to continue their military service
and as a result, receive reenlistment compensation and
additional training opportunities. In doing so, they execute
a new enlistment contract (active enlisted) or sign a Ready
Reserve agreement (TAR-SELRES enlisted and officers). Active
duty officers have no explicit extended service agreement.
Regardless of the nature of the agreement that is made
between the individual and the Navy, the relationship
between both parties changes; the apprentice of the first
obligatory period becomes the journeyman and later, the
ship's specialist in the field. Costs and inducements that
the Navy must compensate with follow suit; wages increase
with additional years of service, additional professional
qualifications, and the rank or rate associated with
increased responsibilities.
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The costs that this thesis will focus on in this section
include selective reenlistment bonuses, and the costs of
advanced professional and technical schools.
1 . Current Studies Costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
Schank and associates included the costs of SRBs
and supplemental professional pays within the
general category of "pay and allowances"
previously discussed as having been derived from
Justifications . The costs of advanced technical
and professional schools were not dealt with in
the Rand paper because of non-availability of % C'
school data.
An average value for TAR bonuses was developed
from the total TAR bonus value provided in
Just if ic at ions . divided by average TAR manning
CO
strength. J
In much the same way that TAR costs were obtained
by this group, an average cost for SELRES bonuses
was found by dividing total funds expended for
reserve bonuses by the average total strength of
the Selected Reserve for the year. Rand
5 2 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis , pp.
117, 119.
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researchers summed this cost at $48 per SELRES en-
listed, and nothing for SELRES officers. 53 This
cost is likely to be understated, for two reasons:
( 1 ) Advanced schools are not included in costs.
Some SELRES personnel selected for shipboard
duty receive brief or modularized advanced
training courses. The "average" reservist does
not require supplementary training for Naval
Reserve Center drills. As a result, the
"average" cost value is likely to misrepresent
actual advanced training costs.
(2) Bonuses are paid for skills possessed bv ship
systems technicians. Active service members
received SRBs in FY 1986; TARs and SELRES
personnel did not, but did receive modest
affiliation bonuses in specific cases,
b. VAMOSC
The VAMOSC included the costs of SRBs within the
enlisted data elements extracted from the Navy
Finance Center. These costs were not isolated for
evaluation. As has been noted previously, the
costs of Regular Navy, TAR, and SELRES personnel
assigned to the NRF units were not included.
The VAMOSC is further inhibited because it states
that it only accounts for costs incurred during
53 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 117, 119.
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the fiscal year by each unit then under
evaluation. This means that advanced training
expenses and SRBs awarded before FY 1986 were not
considered; neither have SRBs or training that
were expensed before their recipients arrived at
one of the survey units, even if it was during FY
1986.
2. Thesis Costing Technique
This paper breaks step with the Rand model because of
differences in costing philosophy. The Rand paper
evaluated all service members joining the command as
being within an acceptable range of a norm: the
^average' officer or enlisted person has been costed
for pay, allowances, and supplementary benefits
through Justifications costs and force personnel
strengths.
Are shipboard personnel within an acceptable variance
in behavior from the remainder of Navy personnel?
Rand implies that they are, and given the size of the
Rand survey, this indeed may be the case. There is no
analysis however, that would confirm this
expectation. This technique invites criticism for a
model with the size presented in this thesis for all
except the most difficult-to-cost elements.
In general, the characteristics that reflect the
"average behavior" of the Navy do not necessarily
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represent the behavior of the officers and men of
these frigates. These characteristics may be
evaluated more efficiently for a population of this
thesis size by separately considering the following:
a. Command r een 1 i s
t
men t s and new prior-service
accessions.
b. SRBs, by number, bonus eligibility zone, and
rating.
c. Command new accessions at the department head
level (and above) for naval officers.
Using what should now be a familiar technique, this
thesis incorporates specific personnel
characteristics taken from unit ODCRs, EDVRs, and NRF
Manning Matrices for FY 1986. The Economic Analysis
Report was then used to identify annualized values
for Selective Reenlistment Bonuses and advanced
training, taking each of the individuals identified
above and pricing them by their rate (or rank) and
rating.
TAR and SELRES personnel do not receive SRBs; as a
result, these crewmembers are costed only for
advanced training consistent with their rate and
rating.
Using the technique described above, this data
represents summary values averaged for the ships in
the survey, by ship type and organization:
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Cost analysis of the previous sub-category led to the
expectation in this area that NRF units would be less
expensive to man, because of fewer career personnel
in the SELRES detachment. The indications here are
that this may contribute in some minor regard to
lower manning costs. Both classes of NRF ships do
edge out their AD peers for cost savings in this
category. Table VII provides a breakdown of these
costs
•
A significant factor in cost savings for this sub-
category is that TAR and SELRES personnel were not
eligible for the SRBs that their AD counterparts
received and as a result, have not been costea here
for them. This factor resulted in an average savings
of $35,278 for the NRF FF-1052s and $16,848 for the
NRF FFG-7 class ships.
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on page 178.
Values have been transferred to the Unit Cost Summary
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TABLE VII
SRB AND ADVANCED TRAINING COSTS
AD NRF AD NRF
FFG-7 FFG-7 FF-1QS2 FF-1052
Active Personnel 201 138.7 262.5 186.6
Associated Costs($) 254,067 183,558 362,541 212,521
Average ActiveX) 1264 1323 1381 _ 1139
SELRES Personnel — 62.8 -- 101.7
Associated Costs($) — 68,304 — 105,871
Average SELRES ($) -- 1088 -- 1041
Overall average costs for all four ship categories
are buoyed up by the investment made by the Navy in
SRBs and advanced training for critical, technical
middle-grade ratings serving on active duty.
G. RETIREMENT COSTS
The cost of military retirement is an ongoing issue of
debate and, as will be observed here, rightly so. As an
element of deferred compensation, it is alternately viewed
as an exorbitant drain on taxpayer resources and as an
inducement for years of continued military service at
less-than-compet i t i ve current wage rates for middle-grade
managers and supervisors.
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The military retirement system is "contributory"; the
Navy, as well as the other armed services, is required to
allot a portion of appropriated funds budgeted to the
personnel account to establish and maintain an actuarially
sound retirement fund for its personnel.
Key differences separate active and reserve retirement
compensation plans. For both active officers and enlisted,
the service member may retire (and draw compensation
beginning at the twentieth anniversary of initial active
duty). It is not uncommon then, to find ex-servicemen at
their fortieth birthaay, drawing a stipend equal to 50
percent of the monthly base pay that they were being paid at
the time of their retirement. Additional retirement benefits
gradually accrue to the active service member as years of
service beyond the obligatory twenty are completed; for each
additional year, the service member may currently see a 2.5
percent increase (beyond the 50 percent baseline), to a
maximum of 75 percent of base pay receivable per annum for
30 years of completed active service. The benefits attribut-
able to TAR personnel are similar to those available to
their Regular Navy counterparts.
3y contrast, the reserve retirement benefits are almost
penury. Twenty years of "qualifying service" are required
but, by in this case, any benefits derived are not payable
until age 60. A certain degree of mental vigor is required
to calculate the benefits to be derived from the reserve
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(officer and enlisted) retirement scheme; a system of
^points' that may be earned for active duty, drill partici-
pation, reserve participation, and correspondence course
completion comes into play. No minimum percentage of base
pay (comparable to active duty's 50 percent) exists; a
"reasonably accurate method is to credit 2.5 percent for
each year of active duty and 0.5 percent for each year of
satisfactory service on inactive duty."-3 -3
While calculating the value of the retirement accrual
was a fairly simple process for actuaries involved in iden-
tifying the annual contribution, the complex system of
"reserve points" (which demanded continuous, scrupulous
book-keeping on the unit level) has taken several years to
refine. This point was particularly important as DoD tried
to develop an effective dual accrual system.
1 . Current Studies Costing Techniques
The Department of Defense (DoD) Office of the Actuary
evaluates current and future manning in the light of
projected economic considerations to derive the
present value of the retirement investment that must
be made. This investment, the Normal Cost Percentage
(NCP), is displayed as a percentage of the current
payroll for force-wide base pay. 56
-^Commander, Navy Recruiting Command, Naval Reserve
Career Information Guide for Enlisted and Officer Personnel.
(1986), p. 16.




Schank and associates analyzed the current method
of service contributions and highlighted the risks
in retirement costing. They observed that to use a
"force-wide NCP" in the frigate costing problem
would be saying that the benefits of retirement
provided for active duty personnel throughout the
military establishment have the same value as that
provided for reservists. As has already been
proposed however, this is not the case; the value
of active duty retirement compensation is substan-
tially higher and available to the service memoer
much sooner.
The single actuarial value in vogue for FY 1985
was 50.7 percent of individual base pay. The Rand
group has used alternate unpublished DoD actuarial
sources to provide a "dual accrual percentage"
that isolated the contribution made by the Navy
for the two personnel categories. Predictably, the
revised NCP that applied to reserve retirement
benefits at 8.1 percent, was substantially less
than the standard. The active NCP showed a slight
increase at 52.2 percent. 57
57 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 13.
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b. Feldman Study
Using projections made into FY 1986 by OP-01,
Feldman calculated separate costs for active, TAR,
and SELRES personnel. In this case, retirement
costs were 52 percent of base pay for active duty
officers and enlisted, 26.9 and 26.0 percent of
base pay and allowances for TAR officers and
enlisted (respectively), and 7.8 and 7.7 percent
of base pay and allowances for SELRES officers and
enlisted. 58
2. Thesis Costing Technique
Researchers have used the actuarial standard
computation as the common method of identifying the
current price of military retirement compensation.
This thesis endorses the method, with the addition of
the following considerations:
a. Assume that the behavior of officers and sailors
in this sample reflects the propensity of all
U. S. military personnel (as a group) toward
continued service and eventual retirement.
b. Recognize that using the single value accrual
percentage (as mandated by law prior to FY 1987)
badly overstated the costs of reserve retirement,
while slightly understating that for active and
TAR personnel. The Office of the Actuary shifted
C Q
Feldman, Personnel Costs, p. 9.
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to dual actuarial values in FY 1987; the dual
values were authorized for use by Congress in
October 1986, and reflected the growing confidence
of DoD managers in both Active and Reserve
record-keeping.
c. In developing an accurate dual actuarial system,
insufficient reserve data was available to provide
a single figure that could be used with confidence
prior to FY 1987. The best information available
to both Rand and CNA researchers placed the NCP of
reserve members at approximately 8 percent. This
was viewed officially as fluctuating as wildly as
a value between 2.8 and 42.9 percent for FY
1986. 59
For the purpose of this thesis, a good guess based
upon cumulative data is far better than a "fair"
guess of the period. Rather than using the estimated
single actuarial value of 50.7 percent for FY 1986,
this thesis uses the approved dual values for FY
1987. Interestingly, the full-time accrual component
at 52.2 percent is only slightly higher than its
predecessors. This category includes the portion of
the crew that are Regular Navy and TAR personnel. The
c q
-^U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations, Military Manpow er and Compensation
Programs, pp. 819-821 and Military Retired Pay Accrual. 99th
Cong., 1st sess., 1986, pp. 72-74.
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part-time accrual component is 26.6 percent—midway
between the extremes presented to Congress, but far
f\C)
above earlier expectations. These values are then
multiplied by the cumulative base pay of each
component of the ship's crew for the year.
(Full-time Base Pay x 0.522)
(SELRES Base Pay x 0.266)






Data management systems throughout the Navy routinely
sum all pay and allowances as part of their
accounting systems. As a result, finding an isolated
value of the base pay for individual ships was
impossible. The procedure used in this thesis to
calculate base pay was to sum the number of personnel
actually assigned to each command by rank/rate and
rating during the year. (This information was
Telephone interview with the Chief Actuary, Office of
the Actuary, Washington, D.C., 12 January 1987.
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available in the EDVRs, ODCRs, and NRF Manning
Matrices of each ship.) These individual values were
then multiplied by the base pay values (also cate-
gorized by rate and rating) found in the Economic
Analvs is Report . The resulting figures were then








The principal studies previously conducted in this
category use the same technique as is presented here,
with few modifications. The Rand study group uses FY
1985 values of 50.7 percent for the single DoD NCP
and then carries the work through again using values
of 52.2 and 8.1 percent for active and reserve force
NCPs. With some elaboration, Feldman's corresponding
values in FY 1986 were 50.7, 52.0, and 8.2 percent
respectively. 62
6 1 Values have been transferred to the Unit Summary Cost
equation on page 178.
°^Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, Uni t Cost Analysis , pp. 37-38.
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The only substantial differences between these three
analyses are the NCP values available to researchers
at the time of their writing, and the scope of their
study. Both Rand and CNA used force average base
pays, while this work uses the pay figures that
correspond to the units in the survey.
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III. UNIT EQUIPMENT AND MAINTENANCE COSTS
The second major costing f a m i 1 j that this thesis
investigates is that of equipment, maintenance, and support
expenses. Each ship is subjected to the same problems that
face any complex machine in a hostile environment; labor and
parts are required to repair specific equipments that fail
with use or misuse, while labor and consumable articles are
required to maintain the ship in a manner that is clean
internally and well-preserved externally. All expenses
within this family are recurring, although changes in
management policy and equipment modifications may cause
transient surges. All costs tend to be fixed with some small
circumstantial variance. This is a result that comes largely
from uniform maintenance practices and everyday management
decisions.
Costing within this family falls into three separate
categories, Ecuipment and Stores. Maintenance Support, and
Base Operating Costs . Each of these will now be summarized,
and their individual components will be studied in the
remainder of this chapter.
Within the category of Equipment and Stores are a number
of sub-categories that relate specifically to the costs that
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arise from the purchase of consumables, parts, and equip-
ments by ship's force on a recurring basis:
1. Organizational and Maintenance (0 & M) Supplies:
2. Repair Parts: and,
Maintenance Support can come from any number of
activities indigenous to the Navy: destroyer tenders and
repair ships, Mobile Technical Units (MOTUs), Shore
Intermediate Maintenance Activities ; SIMAs), private or
public shipyards, systems commands, and their affiliates.
Each of these has technical expertise and maintenance
facilities that exceed those of the ship itself. The ship
then, has a very necessary dependence upon these organiza-
tions for continued material readiness.
This category includes all costs associated with the
outside maintenance and unit support that has been briefly
introduced here. While the costs of consumables and parts
used for ship's maintenance by the crew are included in the
previous family, the costs of labor, raw materials, and
parts provided by the assisting activities are included
here. This sub-category is identified as Intermediate- and
Higher-Level Maintenance.
Included in Base Operating Costs are those outlays made
by naval bases and subsidiary organizations, which help to
support the crews and dependents of the survey ships.
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A. ORGANIZATIONAL AND MAINTENANCE (0 & M) SUPPLIES
Shipboard maintenance often involves the use of
consumable items for periodic equipment maintenance. Cotton
swabs, 0-rings, gaskets, and lint-free rags are among the
many items that fall into this category; they are a part of
a long list of low unit cost items that are hereafter
referred to as maintenance supplies.
Organizational supplies include "the soap, toiletries,
janitorial supplies, paper, and administrative items used by
the unit" -^ in the course of everyday routine for ship's
c
1
ean thl iness , habi t abil i ty , and management. Much like
maintenance supplies, the unit price for organizational
items tends to be low. In both supply sub-categories, the
annual cost has a strong fixed element for both active and
reserve ships.
1 . Current Studies Costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
Rand characterized maintenance supplies as being
consumable items used during equipment maintenance
at either the organizational or intermediate
levels. The study noted that these are used
principally for preventive or corrective
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Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 129.
Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 15.
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maintenance, and that the costs vary with the
"full-time personnel (manning) equivalent". ->
In deriving a factor that could express the
behavior of supplies costing, the Rand group
observed "that as the number of full-time people
on board the ship increases the use of (these)
supplies increases". Several assumptions about
the organization then follow:
(1) The cost of organizational supplies per
full-time person is fixed, regardless of
whether the unit is reserve or active;
(2) The "number of full-time equivalent people on
the ship can be estimated by allotting each
person the number of days worked in a year and
totaling the working days of the entire
crew."° 7 Reservists work 14 days (ACDUTRA) and
(in Rand's calculations) 39 inactive drill
days onboard the ship. What results is the
"full-time manning equivalent" calculation for
each unit, shown in Figure 3:
Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p.65
Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p.





Manning (Officer and Enlisted)
x
Percent of Year Worked Onboard
FTME
g (100 percent for active duty and TAR, 3.8 percent for
SELRES)
Figure 3: Full-Time Manning Equivalent Calculation
The Rand group then took the cost of supplies from
VAMOSC, divided by authorized active duty manning
strength and derived an average full-time cost
value. This, in turn, was multiplied by the number
of FTMEs to generate the & M supply costs of
each ship,
b. VAMOSC
The VAMOSC document summarized costs in this
sub-category under the heading of "Consumables"
(element 1.2.3.2) and included ship's force
material costs during overhaul and those supplies
that are "administrative and housekeeping, medical
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and dental supplies, routine maintenance tools,
. • . and general purpose hardware". As an
accounting tool, VAMOSC provides a comprehensive
summary of costs within this sub-category.
The data required for this category are available
from VAMOSC and appears to offer a high degree of
accuracy. Individual units report the vast
majority of their consumable purchases made in
support of the Planned Maintenance System (PMS)
through predictable Navy supply channels, which
are, in turn, compiled by unit and forwarded to
the Navy Cost Information System/Operations
Subsystem (NCIS/OPS). The VAMOSC taps this
information source for its data. While the Rand
study and the MPFM may offer future cost
prediction value, they cannot offer the historical
accuracy available here for AD ships.
Navy Program Factors Manual
Costs within this category were summarized under
"Other Ships OMN", which includes ship's
consumables and equipage, but does not include any
items used for equipment repair. ^ As a result,
the predictive value of this document is limited
C QDO Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA 017E2),
VAMOSC . p. A-20.
6Q^ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Program
Factors Manual . p. 6.
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in referring to this sub-category. The NPFM is
further inhibited by the absence of NRF costing
data, or explanatory information that would assist
in updating the stated values.
2. Thesis Costing Technique
In budgeting for the purchase of consumable items
onboard both active duty and NRF ships, the unit's
financial managers are provided with a dollar figure
by the Type Commander that represents the funds
available to the ship on a quarterly basis. This
Operating Target (OPTAR) fund is typically divided
among the ship's departments based upon recent
experience and expected need.
Included in the OPTAR are categories for repair parts
and "other" items. (The latter category incorporates
those items which is referred to here as & M
supplies.) These two categories are then broken down
into several elements; the "basic OPTAR" (which is
authorized quarterly by the Type Commander) , author-
ized OPTAR augments (which are Type Commander
supplements that must be justified by the command),
loans from the Type Commander for short-term commit-
ments, and Automatic Take-Ups (which fund overseas
charters and hires, tug rentals, and telephone
services overseas).
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As the quarter progresses and supplies are required,
the crew generates the appropriate documentation to
make purchases from Navy supply stocks and, in
limited instances, through direct purchases from
civilian sources. In all cases, the expenditures are
recorded as debits against the ship's OPTAR. The
OPTAR roughly divides these expenses into the two
general sub-categories that this thesis entitles &
M Supplies and Repair Parts . The key to accurately
identifying the annual costs for these sub-categories
is to then follow the accounting trail of recorded
expenses to the points where Pacific Fleet ships'
OPTARs are aggregated.
This thesis uses the information available from two
such aggregation points in developing supply costs.
The first is the funding source itself; the
annualized values of disbursements for each unit were
made available by the Fiscal Officer, COMNAVSURFPAC
.
The second information source was the Fleet
Accounting and Disbursing Center Pacific (FAADCPAC),
an organization which lies in the feedback loop
between the ship's purchase and force recognition of
that purchase. Once again, annualized values were
available through this office.
As a result, this thesis has an extremely accurate
picture of authorized funding and actual
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disbursements that covers the breadth of the
sub-category. One additional benefit exists:
fluctuations between the authorized and actual
expenditures are recognized here. The OPTAR is not a
static accounting standard; as ship's operations
change and needs or emergencies arise, the funding
system must be flexible enough to allow sometimes
substantial variances in funding. As one example, in
Fiscal Year 1986 USS Duncan was budgeted for $228,000
in this sub-category. Needs surpassed initial
expectations however, and an additional $98,400 were
reprogrammed for use through Type Commander augment-
ations and transfers between funds then available for
ship's use.
The significance here is that the s bottom-line ' for
& M purchases fluctuate with the needs of the
individual ship. This costing technique captures
these fluctuations and ensures their completeness and
proper categorization.
Data for the costing sub-category that includes low
unit cost items for routine maintenance, management,
and habitability were taken from data sheets prepared
by the Fiscal Officer, COMNAVSURFPAC and the Fleet




















The VAM0SC has been referred to repeatedly in the
course of this thesis. Its strength has been its
accuracy and comprehensiveness in dealing with
specific costing subcategories. Its weaknesses here
have included that it does not state MRF costs of any
kind, has no predictive ability, and provides no
evidence that all of the 0PTAR alterations referred
to earlier have been included. Fortunately, VAMOSC
does highlight the sources of its information and NRF
supply procedures mirror that of the active force.
Recorded expenditures may be available in this
category through NCIS/OPS.
As a sidenote, the issue of the full-time manning
equivalent in unit supply costing here should be
addressed. As a forecasting tool the FTME may have
some value, but as an accounting element it suffers
from several maladies:
70 Values have been averaged and transferred to the Unit
Cost Summary on page 178.
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a. Soap, toiletries, and the majority of other items
required for the personal needs of officers and
sailors are available from the ship, but require
private purchase from the ship's store. No subsidy
is provided to the crew for these items. As a
result, they play no part in the actual outlay of
funds for the ship's operation.
b. The bulk of the janitorial supplies, paper, and
administrative items required for ship's operation
are required in much the same quantities for all
ships of the same class
—
provided that the ship is
manned at all--regardless of whether the ship is
in active service or the NRF. Ship's housekeeping
continues in all compartments; the dispensation of
paper as reports, P 1 a n s -o f - t h e -D a y , and
congressional responses carries on, regardless of
whether 60 or 100 percent of the crew is onboard.
c. The FT ME fails to include the depot-level
personnel that play an integral part in reserve
ship organizational maintenance. They, like their
crew counterparts, work on or near the ship. Do
they then induce costs upon the ship in this area?
The answer must be x yes', but the degree to which
this substantial work force creates additional
costs is not considered by the FTME valuation.
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d. The FTME is theoretically unwieldy because it
implies that in one FTME a sailor is continuously
active, onboard, and awake. For example, it
suggests that_ because the average reservist dines
once onboard the ship per four-hour drill period,
his full-time counterpart then eats six times (at
ship's expense) per 24-hour day.
The FTME is not valueless, however it has its
flaws as a potential costing tool in this model.
B. REPAIR PARTS
Items required for the repair of the ship's equipment
are categorized here as repair parts . The Rand study group,
NPFM, and VAMOSC recognize the broad nature of this fixed
and variable cost sub-category. The ship orders, retains,
and expends repair items on its own behalf. Additionally,
repair facilities independent of the ship may provide labor
and parts for the repair of the ship. The cost of parts
drawn from ship's stores and expended by ship's company are
included here; parts and labor provided externally are
costed in depot and higher maintenance sub-categories.
Naval units have a continuing need for funds to purchase
or replace equipage, which are items that display high unit
cost and vulnerability to pilferage. Binoculars, foul
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weather jackets, electronic test equipment, and hand-held
calculators are examples of equipage. The nature of the cost
is fixed-variable; a small annual stipend is provided to
each ship, unless the crew can provide reasonable justifica-
7 1tion for additional funding.
The concept of unit budgeting through the use of the
OPTAR was introduced in the previous section. Its importance
as a planning tool and accounting standard is reiterated
here; the OPTAR is fundamental to the ship's purchasing
system and the costing methodology that this thesis uses.
1
. Current Studies Costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
The Rand group differentiated between repair
parts and & M supplies. "This category
includes the more costly subsystem components
that must be replaced because of wear or
condemnation."' The Rand group also observed
that while sub-category costs are "generally
variable, depending on only the equipment-
operating levels", * the costs for .the average
71 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA 017E2),
VAMOSC . p. A-19.
7 21 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis , p. 15.
'^Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 15.
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frigate tended to be fixed over the unit's
cycle from one major shipyard availability to
7 kthe next.
'
To capture the costs for one year, Rand drew
data from VAMOSC in FY 1983 that, under the
broad heading of "Repair Parts" summed VAMOSC
categories for repair parts, parts exchanges,
and organizational issues. '^ The Rand study
does not specify how the reserve unit's spare
parts were costed in the model. A uniform
costing equation is included in Appendix C,
where repair parts equal the repair parts cost
per ship,' but there is no explanation of
where cost values came from, or the
significance of fixed and variable portions of
the cost. Because repair costs of active duty ^
and reserve ships are equal in the summary cost
equation,' ' the author assumes that this is
viewed as a fixed cost (and thereby equal) or
that the activities that both NRF and active
duty ships were involved in resulted in
variable costs that happened to be equal.
74 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 125.
75 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 130.
76 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 136.
77 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 137.
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Neither case is entirely plausible.
The Rand study group does not explicitly
include equipage as a cost element in their
equation. Because its costing behavior is
consistent and small in comparison with that of
the repair parts account, it is assumed that
the equipage account has been absorbed into the
larger category,
b. VAMOSC
By FY 1985, the data point which summarized the
cost of repair parts used for the alteration
and repair of the ship was "Repair Parts"
(element 1.2.2), which detailed those parts
purchased by the ship to repair its own equip-
ment or to replace onboard spares expended.
VAMOSC does not identify NRF costs, but does
identify the data sources for its elements,
which may record expenditures made by NRF
units.
VAMOSC report equipage as " Equ ipmen t/ Equ ipage"
(data element 1.2.3.1). The data for this
element originated with NCIS/OPS, which
reported all Navy Stock Account items not
included as either consumables or repair parts.
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c. Navy Program Factors Manual
The NPFM provided a class costing value for
repair parts that is applicable to FFG-7 and
FF-1052 class ships in active service. Costs
associated with repair parts for Naval Reserve
Force ships are not tabulated by the NPFM.
Values available have highly questionable worth
both because the factor values represent class
averages, and because of cumulative changes in
ships operations and repair parts purchasing
behavior since the last revision to the NPFM in
1980.
2. Thesis costing Technique,
This thesis draws its data from information and
annual cost figures provided by COMNAVSURFPAC and
FAADCPAC. The earlier section in this thesis which
highlighted consumable & M supplies illustrated
the use of the OPTAR as a precise measure of annual
expenditures. By the same method, this thesis reports
expenditures associated with repair parts consumed
during the year by each of the units in the survey.
Equipage expenditures have already been aggregated
into the data values provided by both COMNAVSURFPAC
and FAADCPAC.
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Data for the repair parts sub-category have been
taken from data sheets provided by the Fiscal
Officer, COMNAVSURFPAC, and by Code AFO-1 , FAADCPAC.
In this instance, the COMNAVSURFPAC data provided an
extensive breakdown of repair parts costs, while the
FAADCPAC data was useful to corroborate the first
sour: ? s findings. The data reflects annualized
expenditures made by the eight ships in the survey
for repair parts and equipage during Fiscal Year
1986.
Unit Repair Costs78
Wadsworth: $820,000 Gray: $477,300
Duncan: $1,272,400 Lang: $383,000
Crommelin: $966,200 Meyerkord: $672,200
Jarrett: $970,900 Reasoner: $804,600
3. Comparative Analysis
The Rand study group considered this costing
sub-category to be recurring and variable in the
short-term, while being fixed over the course of the
ship's repair cycle. As a force-wide evaluation, this
concept appears accurate. The NPFM applied a fixed
value for all unit costs over time, thereby taking an
opposite stance in analysis; it presumes that there
7 8
'Values have been averaged and transferred to the Unit
Cost Summary on page 178.
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are no fluctuations throughout the ship's operating
cycle--a notion that the author has personally found
to be unreliable. The position presented in this
thesis is that the nature of repair parts costs is
fixed, with a substantial variable element.
Equipment failure occurs through use, misuse, or no
use at all. Normal wear-and-tear causes predictable
equipment failure; using equipment improperly or
beyond stated specifications leads to early parts
failure. Paradoxically, electronic and pneumatic
systems tend to fail more often when seldom used.
The Planned Maintenance System (PMS) is an
institutional program designed to identify and
prevent equipment failure through optimum use,
effective maintenance, and early diagnosis of
failures. This system induces much of the fixed
nature in repair parts costs, because of systematic
operation and tests of ship's equipment. Predictably,
the cost of a repair part does not occur until
someone activates the equipment and notices that it
does not operate correctly. The PMS system causes
these tests to occur regularly, with the flexibility
to identify tests that must be done at sea or inport.
Small by comparison with the other costs of supply
and maintenance, equipage is not singled out by other
researchers as a separate costing sub-category. This
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is an interesting division nevertheless, because its
behavior has a fixed foundation with a variable,
circumstantial superstructure. Because individual
purchases that comprise this have high unit prices,
are relatively durable, and highly pilferable, higher
expenditures in this sub-category may reflect the
extremes in managerial behavior. Command management
that recognizes an early need for new equipage and
argues successfully for its funding is one extreme;
lax equipage control procedures and high pilferage
rests at the other extreme.
A strong variable element persists in repair parts
costing, which is directly related to the operating
tempo of the unit.' While significant, the behavior
of this cost is not so marked or consistent to
warrant including "repair parts" in the unit
operating costs family.
C. INTERMEDIATE- AND HIGHER-LEVEL MAINTENANCE
A ship periodically requires assistance from
organizations outside of itself to remain operationally
ready. The nature of this assistance may follow many forms,
which are listed here from those that are most, to least,
intensive :
79 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 129
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1. Regular Overhaul ( ROH)
An operational condition in which the ship is totally
immobilized for widespread repair and upgrading.
Lasting from six to twelve months, the ship typically
undergoes drydocking (for hull and sonar repairs),
and cyclic system upgrading (ship alterations and
equipment modifications).
The conduct of the overhaul remains the
responsibility of the Commanding Officer of the ship,
but the majority of the work is actually accomplished
by civilian or military technicians that have no
organic association with the ship. Ship's force
personnel are typically involved with work projects
not contracted for in the shipyard work package, with
shipboard habitation improvement projects, and with
tests requiring ship's force verification and
approval
.
The regular overhaul is currently scheduled for
active duty FF-1052 class frigates every six years.
Reserve FF-1052 class frigates are not scheduled for
overhauls, but instead undergo comprehensive Phased
Maintenance Availabilities (PMA), which will be
discussed in the next section. All FFG-7 class
frigates participate in an "extended cycle for ship
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8modernization " ou that provides for extensive
equipment and ordnance upgrading on a scope similar
to that of the ROH. Both AD and NRF FFG-7s are
scheduled for the ship modernization periods at their
tenth and twentieth years of service.
2. Selected Restricted and Phased Maintenance
Availabilities,
At substantially less time, expense, and outside
manpower requirements than the regular overhaul, the
family of ^availabilities' is designed to repair,
upgrade, and restore the frigates periodically
between their overhauls or modernizations. FF-1052
class frigates undergo Selected Restricted Availabil-
ities (SRA), lasting from two to four months; NRF
FF-1052 class and all FFG-7 class frigates undergo
PMAs lasting three to four months. Figure 4 illus-
trates the interrelationship between overhauls,
modernizations, and major availabilities for these
three ship maintenance classes:
80 0ffice of the Chief of Naval Operations. Navv
Training Plan. Naval Reserve Force Guided Missile Frigate




X X X X X X X X X X X
FF-1052 Rjpjj SJL& SJLA R.0H SRA SRA
NRF-1052 PMA PMA PMA P MA PMA PMA PMA
FFG-7 PMi P.M EMA PMA EM MOD
Figure 4: USN and NRF Frigate Maintenance Cycles
In both cases, the work conducted on each ship
follows a uniform maintenance program that makes
similar, periodic repairs, tests, and upgrades as
each ship comes due for its availability. Emergent
equipment and structural repairs are also undertaken.
The ship is largely immobilized at a naval or private
shipyard for this work, while the crew follows much
the same routine as for a regular overhaul.
Most of the costs associated with regular ship
operations are deferred while units are undergoing
overhaul and the availabilities referred to thusfar.
POL is off-loaded before the ship enters the
See Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command ( MAVSEA
05L14), Training Plan for the NRF FF-1052 Class Frigate.
(1985), pp. I 9-11; Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Maw Training Pl an. FFG-7 . pp. 1-14, 1-16; and "Ship




shipyard, and all subsequent services provided are
line items identified in the maintenance contract.
The resultant costs then become part of the ship's
higher-level maintenance account.
During FY 1986, USS Crommelin, Jarrett, and Gray
participated in PMAs. Advanced funding was expended
during the year to prepare for the PM and SR
Availabilities of USS Wadsworth, Reasoner, Meyerkord,
and Lang in FY 1987. The following tables highlight
these maintenance actions and their costs.
TABLE VIII
NAVAL ORDNANCE STATION (LOUISVILLE) MAINTENANCE ACTIONS82
UNIT ACTION (FY86)* COST
Gray Overhauled MK 42/9 gun mount $639,000
Reasoner Overhauled ASROC launcher $740,000
Duncan Overhauled MK 75 gun mount $442,000
No NAVORDSTA expenses were incurred by the other five ships
in this survey.
^Telephone interview with Carl Turner, NAVORDSTA
Louisville, Kentucky (Planning Department), 16 January 1987.
112
TABLE IX
COMNAVSURFPAC-FUNDED MAINTENANCE PROJECTS (FY 86) 83

















$1,421,645 (2.5 month PMA)
$1 ,571,570 (3.5 month PMA)
$48,000 (PMA advance planning)
$168,000 (SRA advance planning)
$418,489 (SRA advance planning)
$5,155,966 (3 month PMA)
$441,000 (PMA advance planning)
The values listed above are for maintenance services
provided to each ship using COMNAVSURFPAC funds.
These costs do not include projects sponsored by
systems commands, but do include funding for services
provided by the Shore Intermediate Maintenance
Activity (SIMA) in Long Beach and San Diego.
Resources expended by Mobile Technical Unit Five
(M0TU-5) are also reflected in these figures.
3. Technical Availabilities
The nature of the work in the two to four week
Intermediate Maintenance Availability (IMAV) varies;
^Telephone interview with LCDR Rocheleau, COMNAV-
SURFPAC (Maintenance), San Diego, California, 4 February
1987.
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ship's force plays the driving role here in
identifying where work and repairs need to be
accomplished in this category. Intermediate
Maintenance facilities have maintenance capabilities,
shop space, and technical expertise that exceeds
those of the frigate, but somewhat less fewer
resources than the major service organizations
associated with the higher-level maintenance
previously discussed. The IMA has the burden of
responsibility to define the resources that it has
available to accomplish the work that is within its
technical capability. IMA facilities referred to in
this thesis include the SIMA facilities in San Diego
and Long Beach, the SIMA-Naval Reserve Maintenance
Facility (SIMA-NRMF) in Long Beach, MOTU-5 in San
Diego, and the destroyer tenders and repair ships
assigned to the San Diego-Long Beach area.
The ship's machinery remains largely intact for
technical availabilities, although this is an ideal
period for "open-and-inspect" maintenance and limited
pump, boiler, and systems work. The ship "stands
down" from the routine state of operational readiness
inport by some measure, and receives priority
treatment from afloat and shore intermediate
maintenance facilities.
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The ship undergoing an IMAV remains pierside at the
naval base, and incurs costs for services inport in
much the same manner as it would for normal inport
operations.
Scheduling arrangements for a technical availability
varies somewhat between AD and NRF units. Active
frigates participate in these availabilities every
three to six months, while NRF units located in Long
Beach continuously rotate through availabilities,
subject to the SIMA-NRMF workload and each ship's
operating schedule. Included in the costing for IMA
work is the contribution to organizational
8 li
maintenance referred to next.
4. Intermediate level support for NRF units
A relatively new institution, IMA support for
organizational-level work evolved from a need to man
NRF ships with fewer full-time crew members while
maintaining unit material readiness. The solution
that evolved was to place a portion of the respon-
sibility for ship's force work squarely in the hands
of SIMA personnel. V/hat this does, in effect, is to
lower the organic costs of unit mann ing--bec ause
fewer, less qualified technicians are needed onboard
--but costs are incurred nonetheless by making the
o bOH Telephone interview with LCDR Gary Shore, SIMA-NRMF
(Repair Officer), Long Beach, California, 20 February 1987.
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NRF units dependent upon maintenance expertise from a
source remote to the ship. 85
1. Current studies costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
Rand observed that "ship repair, maintenance,
and overhaul activities are usually fixed for a
class of ships". They added that "over a
broad range of activity, the maintenance,
repair, and overhaul needed is driven by
corrosion control needs, rather than by
»
87
operating tempo".' It was their view that
both active duty and NRF units operated at sea
sufficiently to make periodic maintenance for
corrosion control necessary.
The Rand study group used predictions available
from the Ship Maintenance Division of NOP-04 to
estimate class average costs for IMA work. This
was costed by NOP-04 in IMA man-years per year.
Taking the figures provided by NOP-04, the Rand
group used the cost of employing an E-6 for one
year ($15,374 in FY 1983 dollars), having
observed that this rate represented the
85
86
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Report to
Congress. 1985. pp. Ill 39-40.
87
Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis , p. 129.
Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 129.
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"average SIMA worker". Using estimates from the
Atlantic and Pacific Fleets that stated that
IMA workers were productive only 45 percent of
the time, the Rand group divided productive
labor-hours by .45 to derive required IMA
man-years per year.
The Rand study group elected to use VAMOSC data
averaged over a six year period that included
all 46 ships in the FF-1052 class to derive
overhaul and availability costs, which they
then used in their cost equation. The same
value was then applied to both the active duty
and reserve ships. Because the Rand analysis
studied the FF-1052 class exclusively, it did
not consider the maintenance peculiarities of
the FFG-7 class. 88
The topic of additional SIMA human resources
required for NRF organizational maintenance is
one that is not explicitly treated by the Rand
study, although it does deal directly with IMA
manpower for both AD and NRF units where
scheduled maintenance availabilities are
discussed. The Rand study costed IMA human
resources provided to both AD and NRF ships
based upon a theoretical one-to-six ratio of
88 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, pp. 131-132.
1 17
man-years necessary to support the AD ship in
relation to its Reserve counterpart. 89
(Subsequent research by the Center for Naval
Analyses noted below would indicate that the
IMA maintenance support required is consid-
erably less.) The Rand study thereby provided
an inadvertent umbrella that covered most (if
not all) of the costs that are associated with
SIMA support for ship maintenance,
b. Frigate Maintenance Man-Hour Comparisons
This study by the Center for Naval Analyses
(CNA) sought to verify the claim made by the
Navy that "Reserve FF-1052 Class frigates
require almost six times as many maintenance
man-hours at the Shore Intermediate Maintenance
Activity (SIMA) as Active Navy Frigates". 90
This analysis vocalized several interesting
assumptions, which include the following:
( 1 ) "The unavailability of full-time crews on
NRF ships to perform organizational
maintenance shifts that burden to the
SIMA." 91
89 3odilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 131.
9 Asch, Beth and Feldman, Ronald. Frigate Maintenance
Mar. -Hour Comparisons . Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval
Analyses , 1985 .p. 1
.
91 Asch and Feldman, p. 1.
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(2) AD and NRF units of the same class have
similar organizational maintenance plans;
and,
(3) The accomplishment of organizational
maintenance is unrelated to the OPTEMPO of
the ship. 92
The study further implicitly assumed that work
requests submitted by both AD and NRF units to
the SIMA for accomplishment were all accepted,
and that all organizational maintenance that
required could be accomplished during scheduled
IMAVs without causing the periodicity of the
maintenance action to lapse beforehand.
The CNA study focused on maintenance data
available from VAMOSC in FY 1983 that
(interestingly enough) included both AD and NRF
values for organizational and intermediate
level maintenance. Their findings indicated
that the maintenance labor required for NRF
FF-1052 support was 1.5 to 3 times greater than
that of its AD peer. 9 ^
c. VAMOSC
The VAMOSC management information system
provided the information necessary to directly
7 Asch and Feldman, p. 1.
y
^Asch and Feldman, pp. 1, 4.
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cost each unit for the fiscal year, having
summarized costs imposed at the shipyard,
subordinate IMAs, and affiliated systems
commands. Regretably, this information system
does not likewise aggregate costs for NRF
units. 3
d. Resource Requirements
This worksheet cites funding and resources
required in the Reserve account to finance the
growing number of NRF FFG-7s and FF-1052s
between FY 1982 and FY 1988. Costs were
isolated to within each of the maintenance
categories listed above. One liability of this
data source is that the worksheet does not
discriminate between the two classes of ship or
isolate estimated costs for individual units.
The costs that can be derived here then are
average ship values. -J
2. Thesis Costing Technique
The costs that develop as a result of depot- and
higher-level maintenance are widespread and, among
the equipment costs discussed thus far, the one that
94 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, VAMOSC . Vol. 1,
pp. A 39-41, A-53, A-65, A-76.
95 0ffice of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-39R),
"Resource Requirements for 3 NRF FF-1052s and 16 NRF FFG-7s,
FY82 - FY88," Washington, D.C., 1985. (Photocopied.)
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is most difficult to isolate. A wide variety of
organizations become involved in the material upkeep
of Navy ships: central and local planning agencies
must identify the work required to bring the ship to
a robust state of readiness, while doing so within
the budget alloted; a wide range of local maintenance
facilities provide labor and raw materials to
complete jobs as simple as making lifeline skirting
to those as difficult as re-tubing main propulsion
boilers. Systems commands nationwide take special
interest in the condition, refurbishment, and
replacement of their equipment. The pursuit of costs
here must be comprehensive. There is the other side
of the coin that must also be considered: it becomes
counter-productive to include the unnecessary costs
that are common elements included in overhaul manage-
ment overhead.
Data sources for this sub-category have included the
following
:
a. COMMAVSURFPAC Maintenance and Logistics Office;
b. Naval Ordnance Station (Louisville) Planning
Office;
c. SI MA (San Diego) Supply and Comptroller
Department;




e. Long Beach Naval Shipyard (LBNSY), Analysis and
Programming Division; and,
f. VAMOSC-MIS (NAVSEA 017E2).
The costs associated with ships' intermediate- and
higher-level maintenance include the expenses
incurred for direct labor and material consumed on
behalf of the customer ship. Depreciation of
maintenance facilities' assets, labor inefficiencies,
wastage, and administrative costs above those
directly associated with the ships in the survey have
been discounted in this segmentation process as being
part of higher-level maintenance overhead costs.
The summary cost of higher-level maintenance actions
has been found by adding these expenditures:
a. NAVORDSTA Louisville Projects
Referred to in Table VIII.
b. COMNAVSURFPAC Funding
The values referred to in Table IX incorporate the
costs of labor, material, and services provided to
the survey ships in scheduled PMA/SRAs and for
selected IMA services. Funds expended in preparing
frigates for FY 1987 maintenance actions are
included, as are extraordinary expenses resulting
from material problems encountered during the
year.
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c. Systems command funding
Included in this category are expenses incurred by
the Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command
(COMNAVSEASYSCOM) , LBNSY, and the Supervisor of
Shipbuilding, Conversion and Repair (SUPSHIPS) for
maintenance actions not specifically funded by the
Type Commander. These costs are cited in Table
X.
TABLE X




SIMA-NRMF manning resources have not been included
above, and apply directly both as a result of
technical availability work and organizational
maintenance performed during the year. The following
table lists the cost calculation and manhours
provided by SIMA-NRMF to Long Beach-based units:
q 57 Telephone interview with Ethel Boykins, Long 3each




SIMA-NRMF LABOR COST CALCULATION (FY 86) 97




















Hourly labor rate: $13. 82 98
The total cost of intermediate- and higher-level
maintenance then becomes a summary of all the costs





















97 Telephone interview with LCDR Gary Shore, SIMA-NRMF
(Repair Officer), Long Beach, California, 20 February 1987.
9 Office of the Comptroller, Navv Comptroller Manual . 8
vols., (1986), Section 035750, p. V-96.
"Values have been averaged and transferred to the Unit
Cost Summary on page 178.
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3. Comparative Analysis
Costs that are used for calculation here are those
reflecting only the units in the survey, and only for
FY 1986. The rationale for this is two-fold; first,
averaging intensive maintenance projects that occur
in selected years of a ship's operating cycle may
ensure that the full costs of higher-level assistance
are included in some manner, but what the equation
then demands is a corresponding average for all other
operating values (over the course of the ship's
cycle) .
To explain this further, consider the fuel
expenditures of a ship over the course of its
operating cycle; with deployments and local
exercises, fuel use will tend to be high (as will
cumulative fuel costs). During overhauls there is no
fuel use to speak of. The Rand group cites many of
the costs observed by the Knox -class for one fiscal
year, but deviates from this routine—and thereby
violates cost-time unif ormity--by considering six
years of costs for higher-level maintenance.
This thesis attempts to crystallize the costs of the
survey ships by unit, in a specific time period. To
this end, only the costs of the eight ships are
considered in this data base. What should become
apparent to the reader is the extraordinary expense
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associated with periodic ship maintenance by
higher-level facilities; outlays for USS Jarrett
($2.5 million) and USS Gray ($7 million) accent this.
The VAMOSC management information system provides the
information necessary to directly cost each unit for
the fiscal year, having summarized costs imposed at
the shipyard, subordinate IMAs, and affiliated
systems commands. Unfortunately, specific elements of
the data base are unknown and values are only
available for active duty ships.
The direct costs of SIMA-NRMF labor noted in Table XI
reflect the added expenses associated with IMA
support and (in the case of the NRF ships)
o rgan izat ional -level PMS accomplished by these
personnel. The cost evaluation for these "fleet
support" billets is not complete, however; personnel
assigned to SIMA-NRMF expressly for the purpose of
performing ship's PMS should themselves be costed in
the same manner as the manpower assigned to the
ships. To identify this requirement and to accomplish
it are two different things. For one thing, the
personnel that were to be assigned to the MRMFs
expressly for the purpose of providing fleet support
to NRF frigates does not agree as it goes from the
planner's desk in Washington, D.C., to the SIMA shop
floor. To clarify this point, the Navy stated in 1985
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that "each NRMF is assigned 50 active billets (USN
and/or TAR) to perform administrative and support
functions, with an additional 100 billets for each
NRF frigate assigned." 100 The actual billet
structure for SIMA-NRMF fleet support billets falls
far short of 100 men assigned per NRF frigate, and
even more so when the combined duties of NRMF
personnel are considered. As of FY 1986, a total of
48 active duty personnel with NEC qualifications were
10 1
authorized for assignment to SIMA-NRMF Long Beach.
In practice, fleet support personnel are not isolated
to duties on one ship or solely NRF ships, for that
matter. SIMA personnel here perform in much the same
manner as those assigned to active SIMAs, where
priority service goes to the ship with a concurrent
availability (either active or NRF) or with an
outstanding casualty report (CASREP) that demands
SIMA-NRMF expertise. NRF ships that require PMS
support have third priority for service.
What then are the costs of the fleet support program?
There are two ways to evaluate this:
a. The Executive Officer and Repair Officer of
SIMA-NRMF estimated that 40 percent of their
100 0ffice of the Chief of Naval Operations, Report to
Congress. 1Q8S. p. 111-40.
Chief of Naval Operations, Navv Training Plan (FFG 7
Class) . Annex A-1
, p. 11-12.
127
organization's total workload was consumed by NRF
organizational maintenance.
b. An analytical assessment of the fleet support role
shows something considerably less:
TABLE XII
SIMA-NRMF MAN-DAY EMPLOYMENT (FY 86
)
102
Man-days consumed for NRF IMA support: 29,813
Man-days consumed for AD IMA support: 28,405
Man-days consumed for NRF 0-level maintenance: 7,510
Includes survey frigates, plus USS Sides, Philips, and
Racine.
Roughly assigning four-sevenths of the
organizational-level maintenance figure to survey
frigate support, 4291 man-days were then consumed by
NRMF personnel. Assuming a five-day work week (with
10 national holidays) and in this case, discounting
the "productive time factor" introduced by the Rand
group, only 18 technicians were assigned to perform
the supplementary PMS that these ships required.
The purpose of this thesis is to cost frigates, not
SIMA-NRMF; the data and resultant observations above
10? Telephone interview with tne Executive Officer,
SIMA-NRMF, Long Beach, California, 17 February 1987.
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are preliminary and cursory. Much more study is
required in this area to accurately evaluate the
support role of SIMA-NRMF.
D. BASE OPERATING COSTS
Naval bases exist to support the units that operate from
them. Facilities are provided to berth and repair the ships
while they are inport, to accomodate the sailors ashore, and
to provide their dependents with decent living conditions,
whether the ship is inport or at sea.
Costing this sub-category has its hazards. While the
services provided throughout the naval station are tangible,
only a fraction of these are relevant to the units within
the scope of this analysis. Piers, buildings, and facilities
constructed before FY 1986 are "sunk cost" and overhead
assets which become irrelevant here. Operation of naval
station administration facilities provides insufficient
direct benefit to the units to warrant their inclusion, and
also then become irrelevant. In short, costs that can be
segmented sufficiently to illustrate a clear association
with the ship, its crew, or their dependents become part of
this suo-category
.
1 . Current Studies Costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
The cost of Navy -wide base operations and real
property maintenance was drawn from Justifications
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using elements for real property maintenance,
medical/dental services, and leased services. An
average cost value for each authorized crewman was
found, thereby providing the basis for a unit
cost,
b. Navy Program Factors Manual
This document provides an early, class-wide
average for active duty FF-1052 and FFG-7 ships.
In conjunction with the Center for Naval Analyses,
researchers based their costing evaluation on two
key premises:
(1) One-third of base operations personnel and
operating funds were presumed to be affected
by a marginal increase in the ship loading
plan for the port. (That is, with the addition
of one more ship to the base, one-third of
overall base operating costs would vary
directly, as a result.)
(2) To actually estimate the contribution that
each ship made toward the marginal increase in
base variable expenses, the NPFM made the
number of "non-support USN officers and en-
listed" authorized for the ship a proxy for
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the actual costs of base operations for which
the ship was responsible. ^
The NPFM does not estimate costs for the MRF
frigates in the survey.
2 . Thesis Costing Technique
To identify what the boundaries of this category are
involves some controversy. At one extreme, it can be
said that base operating costs should rightly belong
in the Navy overhead account; the proof of this lies
in the fact that base support facilities are very
rarely augmented by a given incremental value (for
either the individual sailor or ship) when the unit
arrives in its new homeport. On the other hand, the
ship and its crew has some dependence upon the naval
base for subsistence and comfort, which must be
provided at some cost.
This thesis isolates the specific costs that can be
directly related to the support of the crew and their
dependents and writes the balance of base maintenance
and personnel support to the larger organizational
unit that is the base. This interpretation is much
stricter than that of either the Rand study or the
NPFM, where total base operating costs are identified
and then parcelled out, using the number of crewmen
103 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navv
Program Factors Manual . pp. 28, 32, 39, 40.
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as a basis to establish the per capita cost. Those
elements costed here (on a per capita basis) include:
a. Navy Family Housing, Operation and Maintenance.
This subset deals with Navy family housing and
includes the costs of management, services,
furnishings, maintenance, and utilities for the
units available during FY 1986 to crew members of
the survey units and their dependents. Table XIII
provides an estimate of these costs.
TABLE XI
ESTIMATED MILITARY HOUSING COSTS 104




Jarrett 30 x $3166 = 94,980
Gray 28 88,648
Lang 50 158,300
Meyerkord 42 # 132,972
Reasoner 45* 142,470
* Total 0&M Budget U5.854K) / Total Number of Units (1849)
Estimated
Telephone interview with Mr. Brady, Long Beach Naval




A benefit extended to all active duty and SELRES
personnel while they are serving on ACDUTRA is the
cost savings derived by making purchases from the
Navy commissary store system. The cost of the
operation of this store system is assisted by
government subsidization, which should then be
transmitted to the beneficiaries in the course of
this analysis.
Finding the least common denominator within the
Navy population proved to be particularly
interesting in this case. Identifying the cost of
regional and individual commissary operations was
simply enough done, but what could this then be
compared to for a per capita crew cost estimate?
Commissary use varies from sailor to sailor, and
the eligible population in the Los Angeles and San
Diego areas (when active duty personnel,
dependents, and retirees are included) is
incalculable. In this instance, the author was
forced to retreat from a ship-cost focus and
accept Navy-wide population estimates.
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The tabulation found in Figure 5 reflects the
total operations and maintenance costs for the
Navy commissary system:
Military Personnel Funds $35,473,000
Civilian Pay (+) $56,936,000
& M - Nonpersonnel (+) $25,254,000
Total Operating Subsidy (=) $117,663,000
(Surcharge) 105 (-) $43,800,000
Net Operating Subsidy $73,863,000
Figure 5: Commissary Subsidy Calculation '°°
in:
-'Patrons offset subsidy costs in some measure by
paying a five percent surcharge on all commissary purchases.
U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations, Military CgmrrlSgarY System* 99th Cong.,
2nd sess. , 1986, p. 479.
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Figure 6 identifies the means by which commissary
costs are calculated for each unit in the survey. The
active duty crew computation is presented in Table
XIV.
Commissary Subsidy (net of surcharge)
divided by
107
Average Active Duty Strength (Officers and Enlisted) lu '
multiplied by
Average Full-Time Unit Manning
plus
SELRES Commissary Benefits Estimation
Figure 6: Commissary Benefits Cost Methodology
10 7
'Commander, Navy Military Personnel Command ( NMPC
1654H), Third Quarter FY86. Navv Military Personnel Stat
istics. NAVPKRS 15658. p. 7.
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TABLE XIV
UNIT FULL-TIME MANNING COMMISSARY SUBSIDY
$73,863,000 / (587,682 PERSONNEL) = $125.69





















Selected Reservists and their dependents are entitled
to use commissary facilities while on active duty.
Costing for this category is done by taking the per
capita active duty cost derived above, dividing by
that portion of the year that the SELRES detachment
was eligible to use the commissaries, and then
multiplying by the number of SELRES personnel that
actually participated in ACDUTRA during the year.
This calculation is illustrated in Table XV.
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TABLE XV
SELECTED RESERVE COMMISSARY BENEFITS ESTIMATION (FY 86)
UNIT NUMBER OF SELRES 108 x (SUBSIDY/26) = TOTAL ($)
Wadsworth 11 53




Unlike the commissary store system, the Navy
Exchange retail stores are not subsidized on a
continuing basis. With the exception of exterior
and grounds maintenance, Navy Exchanges have
fiscal independence from the base facilities that
they are co-located with. The minor costs of
exterior upkeep are considered here as part of the
fixed costs of base operations. '°°
d. Medical and Dental Costs
The costs associated with the health care of Navy
personnel have a direct effect upon the costs
1 n ft
Telephone interview with LCDR Wells, Naval Reserve
Readiness Command, Region Nineteen, (Afloat Program Office),
San Diego, California, 17 February 1987.
^Telephone interview with LT Smith, U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School (Navy Exchange Officer), Monterey,
California, 11 February 1987.
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associated with the crews of all ships in the
survey
.
Military health care falls into three cost
elements for the purpose of this thesis: medical
treatment (in-patient and out-patient care),
dental care, and Civilian Health and Medical
Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS)
assistance. Active duty personnel are costed at a
per capita rate for services provided by medical
and dental facilities serving the Long Beach and
San Diego areas. Costs are based upon the average
number of active duty personnel onboard, factored
with the & M budgets for clinics and the total
visits or procedures that each of these agencies
was called upon to perform during the year.
The technique used here to cost medical expenses
for each unit is to first identify a Navy-wide
average for outpatient care. Assuming that the
behavior of active duty personnel assigned to the
survey frigates mirrors the behavior of the Navy
in general, average out-patient visits will be
factored with the average crew complement and
local naval hospital costs to identify the unit
out-patient cost.
The average cost of medical treatment for patients
at the Naval Hospital, San Diego was $71 per visit
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for outpatients and $460 per day per bed.
Corresponding values for the Long Beach Naval
Hospital were $69 per visit and $636 per day per
bed. Local dental costs have been estimated by
calculating the cost per dental procedure at each
of the regional clinics. The cost factor in each
case was the solely the operating and maintenance
budget for the clinic for the fiscal year.
Procedure costs for local dental clinics are
computed in Table XVI.
TABLE XVI
DENTAL CLINIC & M BUDGETS (FY 86)
CLINIC BUDGET ($) PROCEDURES COST/PROCEDURE
Long Beach 111 750,000 399,400 1.88
San Diego 112 1,494,697 600,504 2.49
110 Telephone interview with Mrs. Dobson, Naval Medical
Command SW Geographic Region (Office of the AC0S for
Resources), San Diego, California, 20 February 1987.
111 Telephone interview with LT Trost, Long Beach Naval
Dental Clinic, Long Beach, California, 14 January 1987.
11?^
-Telephone interview with CDR Stewart and DT1 Burdick,
San Diego Naval Dental Clinic, San Diego, California, 19
January 1987.
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The technique used here was to cost each member of
the full-time crew for four out-patient visits and
two dental clinical procedures per year. In
addition, the full-time crew was credited for one
ten-day inpatient period per 50 crewmen,
representing a normal likelihood of injury or
serious illness.
The CHAMPUS Program serves as a supplemental
health care system available to active duty
personnel and their dependents, when military
health care facilities are not available or
appropriate for the individual case. Using CHAMPUS
in
operating data, J this thesis develops an average
per capita cost of CHAMPUS benefits, net of
program overhead costs. This value has then been
multiplied by the number of full-time personnel to
generate a unit CHAMPUS program cost.
Selected Reserve medical and dental costs are
negligible for all but emergency visits. While
SELRES serving onboard ship accrue these benefits,
medical/dental authorities and unit commanders
frown upon using precious drill time for any
110
J U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee of uhe Committee
on Appropriations, CHAMPUS Program . 99th Cong., 1st sess.,
1986, p. 1052.
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medical treatment other than that required
following shipboard accidents.
Table XVII represents a compilation of costs for
all personnel categories and the appropriate
health care.
TABLE XVII
UNIT ESTIMATED MEDICAL AND DENTAL TREATMENT COSTS ($)
OUTPATIENT INPATIENT DENTAL CHAMPUS
Wadsworth 37,454 17,262 510 64,559
Duncan 39,110 18,024 532 67,414
Crommelin 62,376 28,748 850 98,005
Jarrett 54,096 24,932 736 93,247
Gray 50,866 23,442 692 87,681
Lang 52,108 24,016 710 89,822
Meyerkord 77,248 25,024 1354 129,404
Reasoner 81,508 26,404 1430 136,540
115
114 Telephone interview with CDR Lohr (Executive Of-
ficer), Long Beach Naval Dental Clinic, Long Beach, Califor-
nia, 5 February 1987.
115J Using S475.75 per service member per year, derived
earlier .
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The summary of unit base operating costs below
represents all costs identified, with values then
















Accuracy is an element that is extraordinarily
difficult to capture in this sub-category. Defining
precisely what costs should be affiliated with the
survey group isolates only half of the problem; the
remainder of the issue lies in finding accurate data
that can be applied directly to the command in some
fashion.
The Rand study group and the NPFM use average force
strengths and Navy program budgets to identify the
per capita costs that form their class-wide base
operating costs. This technique is far from being
exact, but it best serves its purpose; after all, to
isolate the individual costs of all support
facilities and then find the means of applying these
to the entire class of ships would, in sum, be no
better than the original simple plan.
This thesis localizes costs within the immediate
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region, to attempt to capture regional peculiarities
in support services.
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IV. UNIT OPERATING COSTS
A natural division occurs in the analysis of the
materials and facilities required to maintain a warship. The
need (and as a result, the cost) for parts and supplies is
continuous throughout the ship's life-cycle. While they may
vary somewhat, the costs of equipment and stores that has
just been considered are largely fixed. On the other hand,
the remaining cost categories within the family have a
strong variable element. In the remaining analysis, these
costs will be identified and standardized for all units in
the survey. These sub-categories include the following:
A. PETROLEUM, OIL, AND LUBRICANTS (POL)
B. TRAINING ORDNANCE AND EXPENDABLE TRAINING STORES
C. UTILITIES
D. UNIT PROVISIONS
A. PETROLEUM, OIL, AMD LUBRICANTS (POL)
The elements in this category are largely variable costs
representing the expenses incurred for fuel required for the
main propulsion plant and various ship ' s equipments .
Specific costs associated with lubricants are included in
the Organizational and Maintenance Supplies sub-category.
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To better understand how POL costs are generated, why
they are variable, and (most importantly) why there exists a
difference between total costs for NRF and active units, we
must understand the operating behavior of a Navy warship. To




2. Steaming inport : and,
3. Cold iron operations.
All of the ships in the survey are continuously engaged
in one of these three activities. Steaming underway refers
to the operation of the unit at sea; the ship is clear of
piers and support facilities, relying upon its own power to
provide main propulsion and ancillary functions. Underway
steaming involves the greatest expenditure of POL of the
three conditions.
Steaming inport involves the operation of the ship's
main engineering plant while inport. A condition that exists
largely when tests, training, or pier utility maintenance is
required, the ship is inport and has at least some depend-
ence upon shore facilities for support even though it is
sustaining itself in some measure.
POL expenditures are substantially lower than for
underway steaming, but typically higher than for cold iron
operations
. While a ship is in cold iron, the main
engineering plant and most supporting shipboard equipments
are secured; the ship depends upon pier utility services for
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electricity, fresh water, steam, and firemain services. To
say that the dependence upon the pier is likely to eliminate
POL consumption entirely is incorrect, however; pier utility
services usually provide the medium for most shipboard
activities to continue. Ship's equipment are tested and
maintained, while shipboard pumps and electrical generators
remain available (or in operation) to supplement pier
support. POL consumption is substantially lower than either
of the other two conditions.
It must also be noted that underway steaming is not
uniform in its use of POL, either between ship operations or
between ships. Some ship's operations make extensive use of
the speeds at which fuel economy is greatest; passive
anti-submarine warfare operations are one example. Other
operations are equally important but impose a greater demand
for POL; aircraft carrier plane-guard duties and battle
group operations are typical examples. Fuel efficiency is
also variable between ships because of the uniqueness of
equipment, engineering plant efficiencies, and engineering
plant management.
1
. current studies Costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
Schank and associates used data available to them
on projected and actual steaming days, steaming
hours, and annual, average fuel costs to derive a
main propulsion fuel cost.
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This costing technique is elaborate, but not
all-inclusive or efficient. The study identified
this method as excluding the cost of oil and
lubricants, but did not explicitly treat either
elsewhere. Additionally, it cited the
expenditure of fuel per steaming hour without
considering the nature of the operations that the
ships were involved in. Analysis later in this
chapter will associate variable expenditures with
the reasons for those expenditures. At the moment
though, it is worth remembering that "efficiency"
117is not the same as "economy". 1 '
The Rand model follows the characteristics of
their model in the other sub-categories in that it
has reasonable predictive value and can be applied
to ships in both organizations,
b. VAMOSC
The VAMOSC itemized POL expended during the fiscal
year, as reported monthly by individual ships to
the Type Commander. These values were then costed,
using the local purchase process. The costs are
then forwarded to the Navy Cost Information
System/Operations Subsystem (NCIS/OPS) and summed
by unit for the year. These have then included in
1l6 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis , p. 128.
1l7 Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 124.
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VAMOSC data elements 1.2.1.1 and 1.2.1.2.
Alternate fuel cost values can be derived by
summing elements 1.2.1.1.1, 1.2.1.1.2, and
1.2.1.2. 118
While the VAMOSC has no predictive capability,
lacks data on NRF units, and is unavailable until
some time after the end of the fiscal year in
question, it does have several assets in this
case:
(1) It is simple and all-inclusive. Ships report
their use individually, on a monthly basis.
The accuracy of the data through the checks
and reviews involved as it progresses through
the chain of command are likely to be very
high. Those POL costs not included in other
equipment cost categories are included here.
(2) Local fuel sources at current prices are used.
Schank uses a summary fuel cost value that,
while accurate for general use in some
instances, may not reflect local costs,
fluctuations in prices, or efficiencies of
scale in the purchase or storage of petroleum
products
.
1 l8Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA 017E2)
VAMOSC . pp. A 9-16.
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c. Navy Program Factors Manual
The NPFM identified the average cost of fuel
consumed by ship classes, using the price of POL
in 1980. " Fluctuations in oil prices since 1980
are only part of the difficulty in using the NPFM
for costing this sub-category; changes in the
average operating tempo (0PTEMP0) of ships also
go uncompensated.
2. Thesis Costing Technique
Data available for this thesis was drawn directly
from the Navy Energy Branch (NOP-413), which monitors
both fuel consumption by Navy units and the purchase
process for fuels. The values listed in Table XVIII
represent hours steamed in the three plant conditions
of each ship which in part, reflects the distinction
in ship's operating tempo and management policy. Fuel
costs are estimated using the total barrels of fuel
consumed, factoring for fuel prices at $0.75 per
gallon and 42 gallons to the barrel.
119^ Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Program
Factors Manual . p. 6.
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TABLE XVIII
UNIT FUEL CONSUMPTION DATA (FY86) 120
Hours Barrels Brls/Hour
UND MUND COLD UND NUMD AUX TOTAL UND NUND
Gray* 1621 352 6115 27417 1806 139 29362 16. 9 5.1
Lang* 2116 765 5159 33822 4359 38181 16.0 5.7
Meyerkd* 1944 990 5106 24262 4715 48 29025 12.5 4.8
Reasoner 4289 1260 3211 82296 7403 89699 19.2 5.9
Wadswrth 1763 379 6618 19876 533 20409 11.3 1.4
Duncan 1850 757 6153 12198 1727 13925 6.6 2.3
Jarrett 2114 750 5896 26227 1081 59 27367 12.4 1.4
Cromelin 1628 1402 5730 17915 3252 1 21168 11.0 2.3
Eleven of twelve months of operating data available.
When the data from Table XVIII has been revised to
reflect actual expenses, unit costs are as follows in
Table XIX.
3. Comparative Analysis
Table XIX displays the total adjusted fuel
expenditure of surveyed units. Table XVIII showed
these same units in relation to the hours spent
underway and additionally, those spent inport with
the main engineering plant operating.
1 p n Telephone interview with LT Heinrich, Navy Energy
Branch (N0P-413), Washington, D.C., 28 January 1987.
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TABLE XIX 121
UNIT POL COST (FY86)
Data Costs Aju^si^d co§ts








Predictably, fuel costs varied with the steaming
hours of the individual ship. The unit with the
highest expenditure (Reasoner) also was the ship
which conducted a Western Pacific deployment during
FY 86. This ship logged 2.3 times the underway
steaming hours of the median of the other ships in
the survey.
The second characteristic that stands out is that the
fuel efficiency of the FFG-7 class frigates as a
whole far outweighs other potential factors in
12 1 Values have been averaged and transferred to the
Unit Cost Summary on page 178.
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comparing the fuel costs of all eight ships. The
computed operating costs per underway steaming hour
are listed in the following table:
TABLE XX
SURVEY UNIT POL EXPENDITURES PER HOUR

























A third general observation is the significance that
engineering plant management plays in the development
of unit operating costs. While the operating tempo of
the unit is largely beyond the control of the
individual Commanding Officer, the consumption of
fuel that occurs inport (in either of the other two
plant conditions) is a variable over which the ship
has much greater control. The maximum quarterly fuel
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expenditure is still mandated by the Type Commander,
but substantial flexibility remains in how much of
this will actually be used. The fuel that is consumed
inport is reflective of the operational readiness
expectations, training programs, and fuel
conservation viewpoints of each ship's engineering
plant managers.
Once the factors that have already been considered
are taken into account, there remains no discernible
pattern between the amount of fuel consumed and the
organization to which these ships are affiliated. It
is clear that the fuel consumption patterns of seven
of these ships are reasonably similar; the outlier
was also the unit that deployed. Attributing higher
fuel costs to the active units with no corrective
factor for additional operating time would then
unnecessarily bias the costing study; it should be
apparent that a higher OPTEMPO would induce similar
costs in the NRF unit's fuel equations. The means by
which the corrective factor will be applied shall be
treated later in this study.
B. TRAINING AMMUNITION AND EXPENDABLE STORES
This sub-category incorporates the cost of gun
ammunition, missiles, expendable pyrotechnics, and sonobuoys
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that are consumed as a result of firepower demonstrations,
training exercises, and equipment operational tests.
1 . Current Studies Costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
The Rand study group referred to VAMOSC for data.
They assume that munitions consumption is fixed by
ship class, and that this consumption is keyed to
the ship's annual training ammunition allowance.
This allowance was then costed by ammunition type
and quantity to derive the average active cost.
Using the same assumptions concerning consumption
and allowance, Rand applied the same expenditure
1 P Pto the HRF units. '" When used to project ship
class ordnance consumption, this technique may
have its merit. For the purpose of this
identifying the specific costs associated with the
ships in this survey, too many individual
variables come into play to accurately reflect




VAMOSC incorporated all of the ammunition and
sonobuoy expenditures referred to here under data
elements 1.2.4.1 (Ammunition) and 1.2.4.2 (Other
122 3odilly, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis, pp. 132,
136, 137.
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Expendables). ^ All ships are required to report
ammunition expenditures to the Navy Ships Parts
Control Center (SPCC) by way of the Conventional
Ammunition Integrated Management System (CAIMS).
VAMOSC received a summary cost evaluation from
CAIMS for individual ship ammunition consumption.
As a result, VAMOSC had the capacity to accurately
measure the ammunition used by each unit within
its purview. Unfortunately, the scope of VAMOSC
analysis does not include NRF units.
c. Navy Program Factors Manual
The NPFM does not identify costs associated with
ammunition consumption by either active duty or
NRF ships.
2. Thesis Costing Technique
Data for this sub-category was provided by the
COMNAVSURFPAC Ammunition Logistics Office. Because
this office is an information addressee on all
ammunition reports that originate from Pacific Fleet
ships, the accuracy provided here is on a par with
that available from the VAMOSC through the CAIMS
124system: ,tn
1 ? "2,CJ Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, VAMOSC . pp.
A-23, A-24.
1 24 Values have been averaged and transferred to the
Unit Cost Summary on page 178.
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Unit Non-Nuclear Ordnance Consumption (FY 86
Dollars) 125
Wadsworth: 51,526 Gray: 297,062
Duncan: 51,705 Lang: 269,194
Crommelin: 121,498 Meyerkord: 203,028
Jarrett: 14,213 Reasoner: 672,927
3. Comparative Analysis
Averaging the costs of all units in the class will
not work unless the project goal is to provide
long-term, class-wide cost analysis. The reason for
this is that ammunition costs are largely variaole
— not fixed. While it is true that each ship receives
an annual training allowance for munitions, the ship
is not compelled to either expend all ammunition, or
limit its consumption if waivers are requested.
The expenditure of ammunition and sonobuoys is
closely linked to two critical variable activities
--the period of time spent underway (during which
time weapons systems P M S becomes due and weapons
exercises take place) and circumstances in which
expendible stores may be consumed. As an example of
the first case, it should be obvious that the ship
that is inport cannot fire its main gun or missile
b atter ies--the locals would object. Even when the
125 Telephone interview with GMCM Bradley, COMNAVSURFPAC
(Ammunition Logistics Office), San Diego, California, 13
February 1987.
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ship is at sea, proximity to other ships, land, and
small craft strictly limits consumption
opportunities. In the latter case, exercises
conducted in conjunction with ASYJ aircraft and
submarines give cause for the judicious use of
exercise torpedoes and sonobuoys, which may not
otherwise be the case.
The allowance system does not reflect actual ship
operations, or the non-availability of selected
ammunition types. The last constraint is particularly
felt where high unit price munitions like missiles,
some gun ammunition, and selected sonobuoy types are
concerned
.
Another key element in the consumption patterns of
each unit is the general philosophy that each ship's
weapons systems management organization observes.
Some ships make a special effort to schedule gun,
missile, and torpedo exercises whenever the
opportunity provides, in order to continually test
the weapons systems and train personnel. In doing so,
these units may exceed initial allowances in the
course of the year; this problem is overcome by
requesting more ammunition and a waiver for its
legitimate use. On the other side, some ships only
exercise their weapons systems in actual firings when
fleet exercises or planned maintenance schedules
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demand it. It should be clear here then that spending
less on ammunition expenditures may certainly not be
better than the alternative.
C. UTILITY COSTS
In describing the costs included with petroleum, oil,
and lubricants, it was introduced earlier that there
were situations when the frigates had to draw resources from
the pier in order to maintain "hotel" services
--fresh, flushing, and firemain water, sewage discharge
facilities, pressurized high-quality steam, electrical
power, and telephone services. These costs are
predominantly variable; they are determined by the general
characteristics of the ship, the amount of time that the
ship spends inport relying upon these shore utilities, and
the location of the ship when services are required.
1 . Current Studies Costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
The Rand study used VAMOSC data listed under
"Utilities" to cost the active duty units' portion
1 p fi This represents only the major purchases. Other
expenses that fall into this category include selected hull
and maintenance actions, charter and hire costs (garbage
scow service, boat and vehicle rentals), communications
services, printing and publication services, and other minor
services.
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of this sub-category. To cost the reserve portion,
the Rand group assumed that:
(1) Utility costs varied by the number of days
spent inport.
(2) The number of personnel onboard at any one
time did not significantly affect utility
costs.
(3) The cost per hour for utilities at locations
where active duty and NRF ships were berthed
was approximately the same for all ships.
From these assumptions, Rand calculated the
average utility cost per day, and by knowing
average force values for steaming hours underway
and not underway, the estimated days spent
dependent upon pier services. '
The cost evaluation for active duty units is
effective, since it represents the same accounting
problem that both the VAMOSC and this thesis
encounter. The reserwe costing issue has potential
flaws, based upon the conflict of assumptions and
the variable factors that were introduced with
this sub-category. This conflict will be examined
in detail with the comparative analysis.
127
128-129.
Bod illy, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis , pp.
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b. VAMOSC
The data elements that now include utilities are
summed under element 1.3 (Purchased Services).
This element includes more specific costing
segments, which incorporated printing and
publication costs, rental of automatic data
processing equipment and associated contractor
support, rent, utility services, commercial
communications services, and miscellaneous other
support services not included elsewhere. Its
comprehensiveness in summarizing active duty costs




c. Navy Program Factors Manual
The NPFM provides an annualized "average cost of
the energy used to provide power (other than
propulsion) to a ship in a particular class, that
is not provided by the ship itself."' 2 ^ As a
result, the value provided by the NPFM is
extraordinarily limited in its scope, particularly
when compared with other studies and this thesis.
Add to this the fact that no units currently
serving inthe NRF are costed by the NPFM.
128
129
Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, VAMOSC . pp. A25-30.
Office of the Chief cf Naval Operations, Navv ?^o,: ,-?,rr.
Factors Manual, p. 6.
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2. Thesis Costing Technique
Data for this sub-category was provided by Code
AFO-1, FAADCPAC 130 and the Budget Office of LBNSY. 131
All costs highlighted in the introduction to this
sub-category are included here:
Unit Utilities and Services (FY 86 dollars) 132
Wadsworth: 453,349 Gray: 334,256
Duncan: 180,398 Lang: 330,063
Crommelin: 141,877 Meyerkord: 80, 381
Jarrett: 334,814 Reasoner: 182,579
3. Comparative Analysis
The Rand study, VAMOSC, and this thesis all advocate
use of utility expenditures as provided by individual
active duty ships as an effective method of costing
active units. Problems that emerge in costing this
sub-category include the issues of comprehensiveness
versus adequate segmentation, and treatment of Naval
Reserve Force costs.
Adequate isolation of costs that are rightfully
attributable to the individual ship is an issue that
130 E. S. Clemente, "Cost Spreadsheet for Selected
Surface Ships," FAADCPAC Code AFO-1, San Diego, Ca., 1987.
131^Telephone interview with Ethel Boykins, Long Beach
Naval Shipyard (Budget Office), Long Beach, California, 6
March 1987.
1 op
J Values have been averaged and transferred to the
Unit Cost Summary on page 178.
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dominates the Base Operating Costs sub-category and
as a result, it is treated in much more detail there.
The problem in its simplest sense here is what to
count as a ship's expense in the Utilities category.
The Navv Program Factors Manual views this in the
strictest sense; only fuel costs used for basic hotel
services are incorporated_with ship class values for
NPFM utilities. The Rand study group broadens the
interpretation to include all services rendered that
are not costed elsewhere, as do the VAMOSC and this
thesis
.
Where the Rand study suffers is in the philosophy
that underlies their assumptions about comprehensive
utilities costs. Were all ships to be berthed in
stateside naval stations exclusively, then uniform
costing values developed by Rand for NRF ships would
be an accurate assessment of actual costs. -> -> The
truth of the matter is that the costs of utilities
overseas are much higher than those stateside. While
the ship tied up in San Diego has services provided
automatically and at reasonable cost by Port
Services, ships that venture into foreign ports
oftentimes have to deal with indifferent consuls and
profiteering chandlers to arrange for the basic
amenities. Scow services, telephone connections,
'^^Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis , p. 128.
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liberty boat, and car rentals all amount to costs
that exceed daily norms in American naval stations.
Two implications arise from this: the first is that
because NRF ships do not deploy, the costs that they
incur for use of general utilities are likely to be
less than the class average calculations that the
Rand study would suggest. The second implication is
that because active duty ships djo. deploy, their
expected cost of utilities will not decrease as much
as Rand proposes— if at all.
Deployers do have a higher OPTEMPO (predicting
smaller utility costs), but the higher rates of
foreign ports increase daily utility costs
tremendously. USS Reasoner provides the best example
of this among the surveyed ships: although underway
49 percent and steaming inport 63.3 percent of the
year, its utility costs exceed those of USS Meyerkora
(its active counterpart, whose similar operating
figures were 24.2 and 36.5 percent) by more than
$100,000!
There are three point to conclude this sub-category
with:
a. Utility costs are not uniform, and 'average'
utility costs are thereby suspect;
b. When each particular stateside naval station is
considered, the ship that spenas more time in that
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port will have a higher utility bill than its
counterpart which spends more time at sea.
c. Ships (either AD or NRF) that venture overseas
will experience utility costs out of line with
stateside averages.
D. UNIT PROVISIONS COST
The Basic Daily Food Allowance (BDFA) serves as a
separate funding source to provision the ship with
foodstuffs in support of the enlisted crew. It exists to
replace the Basic Allowance for Subsistence in the
compensation of the ship's crew. Although each enlisted man
was alloted approximately $3.70 per day for sustenance, the
BDFA is not viewed as an element of compensation. It is
instead a necessary cost of ship's fiscal operation, with a
strong variable element.
1
. Current studies Qostins Technique,
No studies specifically address the issue of unit
provisioning
.
2 . Thesis Costing Technique
This thesis uses the quarterly BDFA allowance values
approved by the Navy Food Service System Office for
FY 86.
While the BDFA for each ship has some nominal fixed
cost (reflecting the preference of the crew to eat
onboard and ship's management policy concerning
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working hours and duty sections), a strong variable
element exists for each ship because the ship's
compensation for crew meals is determined solely by
the number of sailors which subsist from the general
mess; the following daily routine illustrates this.
For each meal, a reliable petty officer (oftentimes
the galley captain or master-at-arms) counts heads as
sailors enter the "chow line". As each meal ends, the
sum is forwarded to the Food Services Officer, where
it is multiplied by a weighted proportion of the
BDFA 134 *
While the cost associated with the summary BDFA value
is strongly flavored by personal habits and
preferences, it is dominated by the ship's operating
tempo. Inport, sailors may opt for home cooking or
retail % fast food' purchases; underway, the general
mess is the only place to subsist. BDFA costs vary
with the ship's period at sea.
The ship's BDFA is limited by the number of enlisted
personnel assigned to the command and present
onboard, multiplied by the daily rate. It may be
less, but it cannot by more than the maximum crew
allotment. The Selected Reserve detachment increases
the total number of personnel assigned during the
1 "34J The BDFA is accounted for in the following propor-
tions: 0.2 for breakfast, 0.4 for lunch, and 0.4 for supper.
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period that they are on Inactive Duty Training or
ACDUTRA.
The cost observed in feeding the ship's crew is a
recurring, direct, fixed-variable element in the unit
cost summary. All enlisted personnel assigned to sea
duty are entitled to receive three meals per day at
government expense. JJ
A number of considerations must be borne in mind,
particularly when reflecting on the variable nature
of this sub-category:
a. The budget for unit provisioning is based upon two
elements, the Basic Daily Food Allowance (BDFA)
and the number of personnel present to take the
meals
.
b. The BDFA is a standard unit cost developed
quarterly by the Navy Food Service Systems Office
(NFSSO). This office continuously monitors the
costs charged to the Navy (and thereby, to the
ship) for the provisions that become crew rations
and applies an algorithm to establish the BDFA
rate that will apply for the following quarter.
c. Individual ships are responsible for counting the
number of sailors that eat in the Enlisted Dining
Facility (EDF) onboard. While the ship is
1 K
-'-'Officers subsist onboard at personal expense. As a
result, the remainder of this category deals exclusively
with enlisted personnel.
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underway, all enlisted personnel onboard are
counted for three meals per day. This is not an
unreasonable estimate, since the EDF is the only
restaurant available. Inport, sailors are counted
as they pass through the "chow line" for each
meal
.
d. The three daily meals do not carry equal weight in
BDFA costing. The breakfast factor is (0.2)xBDFA;
lunch: (0.4) x BDFA; and supper: (0.4) x BDFA.
These meal factors are multiplied by the number of
sailors participating to derive the standard costs
for each meal.
The variable element in provisions costing is
accentuated by the fact that dining onboard may be
inconvenient or undesirable while the ship is inport;
it is a necessity while the ship is underway. Sailors
living ashore usually arrive as the EDF is securing
in the morning and predictably elect to eat with
family or friends ashore at the end of the working
day. Interestingly, some sailors do not eat lunch
inport because it is prepared as a balanced meal
--snacks and x fast foods' are not part of the norm in
Navy meal planning. Consequently, the percentage of
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the crew that eats while inport is substantially less
than while the ship is at sea ^
The costs reflected in the following data very
closely approximates those costs experienced by each
unit in feeding its crew.
Basic Daily Food Allowance (FY 86) (dollars) 137
OCT - DEC JAN - MAR APR - JUN JUL - SEP
3.73 3.51 3.76 3.51
Unit Provisions Costs (FY 86) (dollars) 138
Wadsworth 166,705 Gray 184,116
Duncan 153,098 Lang 212,632
Jarrett 194,296 Meyerkord 247,211
Crommelin 165,822 Reasoner 269,356
1 ? 6J In an informal survey conducted by the author of
officers and senior enlisted personnel with shipboard food
service experience, most observed between 90 and 100 percent
participation at meals while underway. Estimates of partici-
pation at meals inport varied more, but most agreed with the
following observations (as a percentage of total crew
assigned): breakfast: 33-60; lunch: 33-70; and supper: 25-45.
^'Telephone interview with MSC Carellon, U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School (Enlisted Dining Facility), Monterey,
California, 9 January 1987.
138 Telephone interview with Mrs. Reinhart, Navy Food
Service Systems Office, Washington, D.C., 14 January 1987.
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E. OPERATING VARIABLE COSTS CORRECTION
Several of the cost s u b -c a t eg o r i e s that we have
evaluated have dealt with an interesting— and unanswered
--question: If, in the course of their assigned duties, one
group of ships had a different operating routine from
another, and if in that operating routine additional costs
were imposed, then how is the inequality treated? The
specific issue that we must deal with refers to the
recurring, variable costs of POL and other materials
consumed at higher levels with greater operating time.
The Rand study group made it clear that active duty
ships were, in most operating categories, at least as
expensive to maintain as their reserve counterparts. ^" How
much of this was due to being at sea for a longer period?
This section seeks to deal with the question of whether
NRF ships are cheaper to operate than active ships. To do
this, it is necessary to ensure that the units that we are
evaluating have commonality in the nature of how their costs
are incurred. Active duty ships deploy periodically; in the
preparation and execution of this, a lot of time is spent at
sea, and more variable costs are incurred than deferred. NRF
ships remain close to their homeports; utility costs are
higher, but other costs are lower for operations. In the
139
140
Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, Unit Cost Analysis , p. 137.
Bodilly, Pei, and Schank, p. 137.
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course of their operations, NRF ships help to train one (and
sometimes two) SELRES crews. The points here are that:
1. The ships of both organizations endeavor to meet Navy
objectives for their employment; and,
2. The operating costs differ, as a result. Table XXI
uses the operating data from Table XVIII to display
the differences in operating activity that the survey
ships experienced in FY 1986:
TABLE XXI
UNIT OPERATING PERCENTAGES









The costs differ, but we seek to establish an
equitable cost comparison. An adjustment to the cost
equation is necessary to do this. There are two ways
available:
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a. Determine the additional costs necessary to
operate an NRF ship in an active duty ship's
schedule; or,
b. Determine the cost adjustments necessary to
operate an active duty ship on an NRF ship's
schedule.
Which way is better? The author chooses to ask a
simpler question here: which way is more practical ?
For the first alternative, deploying a ship for six
months would require the continuous presence of one
SELRES crew which, given that they are only available
for two weeks apiece for ACDUTRA, demands 26
different detachments. This alternative is ludicrous;
costs of pay, plus additional logistic and
transportation costs would sky-rocket. The crew,
rather than being battle-ready, would be weary and
largely unfamiliar with their temporary surroundings.
The second alternative, to calculate costs based upon
a common scale using the NRF schedule, is infinitely
more workable. The key to this problem, after all, is
not to find out how high we can make units manning
costs go; it is to adjust the variable costs of
equipment operation. Manning costs should not change
at the NRF scale.
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1.
Current Studies Costing Techniques
a. Rand Study Group
This study introduced the variable nature of
POL and certain equipment costs, but did not
include a common operating cost factor of the
nature discussed here.
b. VAMOSC
The VAMOSC deals strictly with costs incurred
and does not develop alternate costs or
provide a method by which these costs may be
estimated
.
2. Thesis Costing Technique,
The actual operating schedules for the eight
surveyed ships were evaluated for FY 1986. IH1 All
operating time was placed in one of six operating
classifications:
a. Overhaul/SRA/PMA
To belong in this category, the ship was
engaged in higher-level maintenance. Variable
operating costs are minimal; variable utility
(caretaking) costs are relatively higher.
b. Inport and Upkeep
This category includes time spent pierside
conducting routine maintenance and activities.
Commander Naval Surface Forces Pacific, "Quarterly
Operational Schedules, Fiscal Year 1936," San Diego, Ca.,
1986.
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Concurrent inspections and tests may be
underway (including Mobile Training Team
visits and type training inport). The
engineering plant is secured, with low
variable operating costs and higher variable
caretaking costs.
c. Port visits overseas
Similar to inport activities above, this
category includes port visits at anchor or
pierside overseas. Variable costs of operation
tend to be higher than stateside; engineering
plants are at a higher condition of readiness
and, in the case of FF-1052s, at least one
boiler well be operating continuously. Accor-
dingly, variable caretaking costs tend to be
lower than for stateside inport activities.
d. Inspections
The primary employment of the unit during the
time specified, this includes major
operational inspections that stress
1 u poperational readiness and unit skills.
Variable operating costs are higher; more time
spent at sea, with inport time spent in a
1 liPmThese inspections include the Nuclear Weapons
Technical Inspection (MWTI), Operational Propulsion Plant
Examination (OPPE), and Refresher Training (REFTRA).
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steaming condition. Variable caretaking costs
are at the norm or lower.
e. Independent steaming, transits, and local
operations
.
The ship is operating at sea, conducting
independent drills and systems training.
Variable operating costs are higher;
caretaking costs are at a minimum.
f. Underway exercises
The ship is operating at sea, on specific
assignments or in company with other ships.
Variable operating costs are higher; variable
caretaking costs at a minimum.
The unit costing model is closely linked to the
operating schedules of the ships selected for two
very critical reasons. The first reason is that the
ship that spends more time at sea costs more to
operate, if for no other reason than because the cost
of ship's fuel and lubricants are higher than the
cost of utility services available while inport.
Previous studies have highlighted the average costs
of operation and maintenance, but do not associate
these costs in any manner to the operating tempo of
the ships.
In the studies that this thesis has evaluated it has
been a common point that the difference in operating
tempos is observed but not adjusted for. To make a
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valid costing comparison, the operating behavior of
both organizations' ships must be made equal and then
compared.
To develop an equal relationship, the following
technique is used:
a. Identify the standard correction
Unit costs in four of the sub-categories examined
by this chapter will be corrected. The corrective
factor represents the difference between the
standard operating days or hours, and those that
were actually observed during the year.
Steaming hours standard correction for POL consur.ct ion :
(14.7 days/qtr x 4 qtrs x 24 hrs/day) = 1411.2 hrs/yr
Underway days standard correction for Ordnance expenses and
Provisions expenses:
(14.7 days/qtr x 4 qtrs/yr) = 58.8 days/yr
Standard hours correction for Utilities expenses :
(365 days/yr x 24 hrs/day) - 1411.2 = 7348.8 hrs/yr
b. Identify actual days or hours that the unit spent
in the operating condition that induced the
variance from the standard operating value:
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(1) POL expenses resulted from operating the main
propulsion system. The following values
reflect the hours that each of the survey










(2) Expenses for use of training ordnance,
expendable stores, and provisions occurred
largely as a result of days spent actually
underway. The following values represent the
sum of days spent participating in exercises
or independent steaming:
Wadsworth: 87 Gray: 66
Duncan: 85 Lang: 126
Crommelin: 80 Meyerkord: 105
Jarrett: 109 Reasoner: 216
(3) Expenses for utilities consumed occurred while
the unit was inport. The following values
represent the number of hours that each ship
spent not underway:
Wadsworth: 6997 Gray: 7004
Duncan: 6910 Lang: 6455
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Crommelin: 7132 Meyerkorci: 6642
Jarrett: 6646 Reasoner: 4471
c. Generate variance factors for each unit in each
sub-category. The variance factor is formulated by
dividing the standard value for each sub-category
by the actual value observed for each unit:
TABLE XXII
UNIT VARIANCE FACTORS









































d. Multiply variance factors by corresponding data
values to identify unit standard costs in each
sub-category. Standard values have been calculated
for each unit, with the average value underneath
that of the actual value in the Unit Cost Sumr.iary.
17'
V. UNIT COST SUMMARY
The unit cost summary is the final equation that links
ail of the individual elements of the three costing families





















Retirement Costs 1,646,473 1,457,353 1,379,870 1,134,317
Sub-frota! 3,074,987 7,763,266 6,592,859 5,460,060
100% 96% 82% 68%
UNIT MAINTENANCE COSTS











2,131,766 5,053,210 3,636,248 2,372,343










































SHIP UNIT COST 12,945,333 14,791,215 11,479,793 8,901,643
(%) 100% 114% 89% 69%
STANDARD COST
(%)
11,216,669 14,087,221 11,027,269 8,641,480
100% 126% 98% 6%
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter is composed of three sections, which are
closely related to the initial objectives of the thesis.
The first section, Unit Cost Analysis , briefly summarizes
the findings of the cost research done here earlier. The
second section, Costing Studies Critique , provides a concise
analysis of the studies that this thesis has reviewed. The
final section, Observ a t ions . relates this work and its
findings to the current environment and briefly discusses
issues that affect the ship manning question.
A. UNIT COST ANALYSIS
Among the initial questions that this thesis posed asked
whether the transfer of frigates from the active force to
the NRF resulted in additional indirect costs to the
organization that lost these assets. These costs were
presumed to arise through lower retention and higher
variable costs because of more time spent at sea.
The answer to this question, based upon the research
conducted here, is N no'. Transfer of units to the NRF has
come at the same time as the Navy's celebrated expansion to
a
N
6 ship fleet'. This has also coincided with fewer
Indian Ocean ship commitments, as Middle Eastern tensions
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have stabilized. As a result, Regular Navy ships assigned to
the Third Fleet actually spent fewer days per quarter at sea
than they did in past years.
1 . Manpower Costs
Within this family, values for each sub-category for
the FF-1052 class were close for both organizations
units, largely because of the number of full-time
crewmen assigned to the NRF units. Manning costs for
the NRF FF-1052s averaged 95$ of their active duty
counterparts. A much greater separation existed
between the FF-1052 and FFG-7 frigates; predictably,
the economies taken in planning personnel billets for
the Perrv class made these frigates substantially
cheaper to man than either the Regular Navy or NRF
Knox class ships. Additionally, there was a substan-
tial cost difference in manning the FFG-7s; within
this survey, it only cost 80 cents on the dollar to
man the NRF ship, in comparison with the active unit.
Given the present manning policies in effect in the
Navy, very little savings are observed in manning the
FF-1052 class with Reservists. On the other hand,
transferring FFG-7s to the NRF appears to have a
substantial impact upon the observed manpower budget.
2. Unit Maintenance Costs
The results observed in costing this family yielded
many surprises. The labor-intensive AD FF-1052
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generated an average cost at or below those of the
other ship classes in the survey. The one instance in
which average costs were exceeded by the AD FF-1052
came as a result of the Base Operating Costs sub-
category, which was heavily flavored by Navy-wide
averaging and actual manning values.
As a ship class, the FFG-7 proved to be substantially
more expensive in the Repair Parts sub-catesorv than
the FF-1052s. This result is consistent with the
degree of sophistication associated with this newer
ship system, and in keeping with the higher average
costs that result from replacing "black boxes" in the
maintenance cycle, rather than the cheaper, tradi-
tional process of repairing ship's equipment compon-
ents onboard.
The higher-level maintenance conducted on ships and
weapons systems proved to factor heavily in the
overall costs of this family. Little analysis can be
done within the time period of a single year--other
than to reiterate that higher-level maintenance is
conducted at a premium price. More effective main-
tenance comparisons may be accomplished by gathering
data over the course of the maintenance cycles of
these ships--a period of six to ten years.
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3. Unit Operating Costs
The purpose in developing and applying the standard
cost algorithm to the observed costs for each ship
class was to first consider the actual costs of
operation, and to then consider costs once more after
the effects of a ship's sea time had been neutral-
ized .
As was expected, there was a direct relationship
between a ship's steaming hours and costs of POL,
ordnance, and provisions; an inverse relationship
existed between hours at sea and the cost of utili-
ties.
As a ship class, the FFG-7 demonstrated the superior-
ity of its gas turbine engineering plant through POL
costs that were far lower than those of the FF-1052
class. Ordnance costs for the year were much higher
for the FF-1052s as a class. Utilities costs were
higher for NRF ships than their AD counterparts,
considering both actual and standard costs. Provis-
ioning AD units cost more than it did for NRF ships:
the influence of this cost behavior appears strongly
related to the sea time of each of the ships.
Among the operating costs observed here, several
results emerge:
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a. The FFG-7 class operates at a fraction of the
price of the FF-1052, regardless of organizational
affiliation.
b. Ac tual costs associated with AD ships are higher
than those of NRF ships.
c. When costs are standardized . the NRF FF-1052 costs
more to operate than the AD ship of this class.
Operating costs of AD and NRF FFG-7s are almost
identical.
4. Total costs
Within this survey group, it cost 14 percent more to
operate NRF FF-1052s than it did to operate the AD
ships of this class. By contrast, FFG-7s operated at
76 percent of the costs observed by the AD units of
this class.
B. COSTING STUDIES CRITIQUE
1 . VAMOSC
It has been stated repeatedly throughout this
thesis that the VAMOSC provided (what appeared to be)
an accurate, comprehensive, historical assessment of
costs associated with active duty units. It is clear
that a data management system exists here that can
effectively provide summary cost data on more than
500 naval units with a wide variety of missions and
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expenditures . Why then are Naval Reserve Force ships
excluded from this analysis?
The author of this thesis spent months 'reinventing
the wheel' in developing a summary cost algorithm
that has used a common source of data for both
organizations' ships. The result is accurate, but it
is not the same wheel that personnel at NAVSEA 017E
or their contractor, Information Spectrum, Inc., have
developed. Ancillary cost assessments and segmenta-
tion methods will differ with each author's view o f
what should and should not be included, and such
will certainly be the case here when the FY 1986
VAMOSC is published.
The charter of the VAMOSC should be expanded to
incorporate NRF units, using the same costing
philosophy as is used for their active counterparts.
Even though much of the data required is now avail-
able to VAMOSC editors, there is no indication that
the current 'active duty-only' analysis will be
expanded. For the sake of providing an accurate,
comparative reference on the subject, this policy
should change.
2. Na,w Program factors Ejacmai
This document provides an interesting view of how the
Service costed its ships and aircraft in 1980, but it
is now oadly behind the times. The data or estimates
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that were originally used to develop the specific
cost categories are not clearly defined in the text
and as a result, the reader is left to wonder how
changes in manpower compensation, operational
policies, and POL costs may have affected each entry.
The NPFM was originally intended for general planning
purposes rather than for actual budgeting and these
figures were then to be used solely to reflect
class-wide behavior. That there is no reference to
contemporary NRF units condemns the NPFM for use in a
comparative analysis of this type.
The Navv Program Factors Manual proved to be out-
dated and much too general in its approach to be of
any value for effective analysis. The opposite was
true of the Economic Analysis Report: the format and
specificity of this work made it easy to use. As a
reference guide for almost any element associated
with a Navy manpower problem, this work has compre-
hensive, but detailed analysis.
In looking for a thoughtful, comprehensive costing
analysis that incorporates predictive analysis, the
best source is the Rand study ( Unit Cost Analysis ).
While the author of this thesis has found many
reasons to disagree with Rand's methodology, it is an
excellent work for the comprehensive sample that it
seeks to analyze. The techniques explained here
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This thesis has introduced three techniques in compara-
tive unit costing that are worth reviewing:
1. Annualized costs
A comparative analysis is only valid if costs are
segmented by time, as well as organization. This
concept was particularly important as the thesis
explored the costs of manpower bonuses and training.
2. Actual costs
This thesis benefited from having a sample size small
enough to identify costs that were actually incurred
during the year by each of the survey ships. The
differences between actual manning and the alternate
costing methods proved to be particularly important
as costs were evaluated.
3. Standard Operating costs
This thesis introduced the notion that the variable
costs associated with ship operating time may heavily
influence the costs observed in some sub-categories.
Among the difficulties that spring forth when units
from two essentially independent organizations are
compared is to find a reason for the comparison. What
should then follow is a search for common values thai:
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allow the comparison to take place. This is parti-
cularly important when evaluating the Regular Navy
with the Naval Reserve Force. The role of the Regular
Navy is to provide an instantaneous response, with
trained professionals, in support of national
policy. This mission is not the same as that which
the Naval Reserve is chartered for, which is to
provide sustained support for a naval campaign based
upon an optimum use of the nation's mobilized
resources. This thesis has gone into depth concerning
the funds required by each organization to sustain
their ships, but has not considered the merit of
retaining two parallel organizations.
Time is linked closely with readiness in the config-
uration of the nation's naval policy. To illustrate
this, consider that if neither was considered
important, then no standing navy would be required.
Maintaining the Regular Navy affords the nation an
instantaneous response when its leaders deem it
necessary. Retaining a Naval Reserve provides the
machinery for a timed response, where large numbers
of men and ships are required for combat some time
after the initial mobilization call. Optimizing these
two policies simultaneously is far more important
than seeking optimization at the lower level associ-
ated with individual ship costing.
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This thesis represents a cost analysis of one small
segment of both the active navy and the Naval Reserve
Force. Its value lies not so much in its bottom-
line' which, by the time that you read it, will be
little more than an interesting historical oddity.
Its worth rests in the methodology; how the technique




OF THE NAVAL RESERVE FORCE
The rapid mobilization of manpower and resources in 19^0
introduced the trial-by-fire of American naval reservists in
a truly broad arena. The expansion of the Navy in the
ensuing years rapidly overtaxed the limited resources of the
Navy's prewar active duty cadre, demanding an immediate
influx of naval reservists into all elements of the Service.
The later war years saw no less than 75 percent of the
Navy's billets filled by Naval Reservists.
The success of Reserve participation in the war, coupled
with the presence of far more newly -commissioned destroyers
and escorts than the postwar active duty forces needed, gave
rise to the transfer of combatants to the Naval Reserve
Force. The primary purpose for this transfer was to allow
Naval Reservists to remain aware of modern warship mainten-
ance ana operations through "hands-on" training.
The formula that developed called for the assignment of
combatants to the Naval Reserve Force in ports located close
to major regional population centers. A small cadre of
active duty personnel woula maintain the ships on a daily
basis. Naval Reservists would alternately train at their
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local Naval Reserve Center ashore, and onboard the ship
while it was either underway or inport. The training would
be held one weekend every month. Once each year, the Naval
Reserve detachment would embark on their assigned ship for
two weeks of intensive active duty training (ACDUTRA).
Introduction of "modernized" WWII destroyers •J of the
Gear ins and Carpenter classes took place after 1969, to
replace aging destroyer escorts that were not considered
worth upgrading. NRF strength built to approximately 30
ships soon thereafter. This strength remained fairly
constant through the following decade, with the original
mission, to train assigned SELRES personnel, largely
unchanged
.
The development of highly sophisticated weapons systems
after World War II made the continued use of the FRAM
destroyers in reserve service a stopgap measure at best; the
ships were vulnerable to potential adversaries of both
principal and lesser navies, despite the improvements thai:
had been made to them since 1945. Additionally, the men
assigned to these obsolete platforms would require substan-
tial retraining before they might be reassigned to more
modern warships in the even: of mobilization. In assigning
these personnel to platforms that did not allow them to
-^Selected Gearing and Carpenter class destroyers had
undergone modest overall improvements and became known
as FRAM (Fleet Rehabilitation And Modernization) destroyers.
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maintain their proficiency in state-of-the-art naval techno-
logy, much of the original value of their active duty
training was allowed to go to waste.
TABLE XXIII
NAVAL RESERVE ORDER OF BATTLE, 1976 - 1984
Ship Class Fiscal Year
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
Gearing 32 28 27 26 25 17 7 4 2
Carpenter 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Eason 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Knox 4 6 6
Perry 3
TOTALS 34 31 30 29 28 20 13 11 12
Selection of the FF-1052 and FFG-7 classes as successors
to the FRAMs began in the late 1970s as the Navy sought to
resolve a dual problem: ridding itself of the nearly
worthless FRAMs (before Congress insisted upon their
overhaul for continued service) and finding an adequate
replacement for Naval Reserve training. Table XXIII
illustrates the transition from the FRAM destroyers to FF-
1052 and FFG-7 class frigates. Efforts to reduce reserve
force strength by 40 percent in the latter half of uhe
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decade failed; Congress repeatedly made itself clear that it
wanted a Naval Reserve, and ohe Navy was to find a v/ay to
make the mandate work.
The solution glimmered briefly in 1979 and 1980 as the
Navy proposed the construction of a small ASW frigate (known
during its short lifespan as FFX). Originally devised to
supplement the FFG-7 class as a marginally effective (but
inexpensive) ASW ocean escort for use in low-threat areas,
the FFX class was to have been turned over for operation by
the Naval Reserve Force immediately after commissioning.
Original plans called for twelve of these ships to be
constructed, with initial construction to begin in FY 84. 4 ^
The plan drew immediate and relentless criticism from both
Houses of Congress when the administration requested $15
million for advance planning funds. The House Armed Services
Committee summarized Congress's opinion by stating (somewhat
surprisingly) that capability rather than cost should
determine weapons design, and that the FFX as proposed was
ijic
"sacrificing combat power to artificial cost limits." ' 3
As the destroyers that the reservists were assigned to
continued to age, the Navy looked to the surface combatants
then in service and production for potential transfer to the
NRF. The roles that their predecessors in World War II
144 Norman Polmar, The Shies and Aircraft of the U. S.
Fleet (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1985), p. 176.
-^Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Inc., Conu ress ional
Quarterl y Almanac. 1981 . p. 219.
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played were still important, four decades later. Among these
were
:
1. Defending Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC) against
interference
;
2 . Providing convoy escort services for amphibious
assault forces; and,
3. Providing escort services for underway replenishment
146groups.
The characteristics of these duties seemed ideally
suited to both the new classes of frigate and the Naval
Reserve. Increased naval activity to project power overseas
and to support our allies would fully tax the resources of
the Regular Navy, which would be employed on priority
assignments, supporting carrier battle and surface action
groups in offensive operations. The ships that would fill
the convoy escort roles would have to face a balance of
requirements and restraints (despite Congress's appearance
of generosity); while being able to counter the medium- ana
low-level continuous threat of a first- or second-rate
adversary, the frigates must have a unit price low enough to
provide high volume output from American shipyards, with a
pricetag palatable to Congress.
In 1981 the Naval Reserve ASVJ Frigate Implementation
Plan was presented to Congress. This proposal by the Navy
called for the transfer of twelve FF-1052 class frigates to
146 Polrr.ar, Ships and Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet, p. 160.
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the Naval Reserve by 1986. The Plan was later modified in
the same year to provide for the transfer of the first FFG-7
class frigates then constructed to the NRF, in order to
build to a reserve force level of 24 modern warships. The
Plan was further modified in 1982 with the projected
transfer of 8 FF-1052s and 16 FFG-7s to the Naval Reserve in
lieu of previous proposals. Furthermore, two additional
FFG-7s were to be transferred to the NRF to coincide with
the commissioning of the battleship Wisconsin battle group
in Corpus Christi, Texas in 1990. 147
147 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Report to the




The ships selected for transfer with the inception of
the NRF ASW Implementation Plan have come from the two
largest ship classes constructed in the postwar United
States.
1 U8The frigate has been, since World War II, a primary
ship type designed to escort convoys in medium- and low-
threat areas. With this purpose in mind, both the Knox and
Perrv classes are well-suited for the task. Although limited
in their designed speed (maximum 27-30 knots) to keep up
with carrier battle groups, these ships have both the
endurance and speed to serve a convoy commander's needs.
Table XXIV displays the projected frigate order of battle of
the Regular Navy and Naval Reserve Force for the next
decade.
-I h Q
To avoid confusion, the ship classification 'frigate'
will be used to identify those ship classes which, until the




PLANNED FRIGATE FORCE COMPOSITION FY 86 - 94149
Fiscal Year 86 37 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
Active 98 96 91 92 90 90 90 89 88
Reserve 15 19 24 24 26 26 26 26 26
Total Force 113 115 115 116 116 116 116 115 114
A. FF-1052 (KNOX) CLASS
This class numbers 46 ships, commissioned between 1969
and 1974. A high endurance ship, comparable in size to a
World War II destroyer leader, the Knox class frigate
possesses an extraordinarily potent ASW suite. In much the
same manner that their World War II predecessors were called
upon to protect convoys against German U-Boat and Japanese
I-Boat threats, these ships have been built and modernized
to counter the immense Soviet force. Their weapons systems
are matched for this purpose with the capacity to maintain
one LAMPS Mark I torpedo-bearing helicopter. The ship itself
49 Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Report to the
Congress. 1987. p. 72.
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has both rocket-thrown (ASROC) and ship-launched ASW
torpedoes
.
The Knox class has a modest anti-surface raider capabil-
ity with HARPOON missiles and a five-inch multi-purpose gun
mount. Its anti-air warfare capability is meagre, with the
5" gun and either the Close-in Weapons System (Vulcan
Phalanx) or NATO Seasparrow missile systems for proximity
1 en
del ense. J
B. FFG-7 (OLIVER HAZARD PERRY) CLASS
The Perrv class was designed and built to retain much of
the potency of the Knox class's ASW outfit while streng-
thening the anti-air warfare capabilities of the escort. To
this end, the Perrv class is equipped with a single missile
launcher and rapid fire gun, providing substantially better
local area defense. As built, the Perrv class's ASW suite is
unimpressive; the hull mounted SQS-56 sonar offers only
limited range. This capability has been augmented by the
planned installation of towed-array passive sonar systems in
both active and NRF ships, and the capacity to maintain two
SH-60B or SH-2F ASW torpedo-bearing helicopters aboard. 151
Integral to the design of this ship class was the
significant reduction in personnel required to serve
150 Polmar, Ships ?nd Aircraft of the U. S. Fleet, pp.
170-172.
l51 Polmar, pp. 160, 162-165.
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onboard; this can be seen clearly in comparing the manning
levels of the FFG-7 class with previous classes, in Table
XXV. The substantial difference in manning levels between
the FF-1052 and FFG-7 classes weighs heavily in many of the
costing categories evaluated by the body of this text.
TABLE XXV
NRF UNIT MANNING LEVELS
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